Draft Convenience Translation, 13 May 2015 - subject to further review

- Convenience Translation -

[Letterhead of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority [Bundesanstait fur
BaFin]

BaFinl Postbox 12 53 53002 Bonn

Return Receipt

Personal] Con?dential

Deutsche Bank AG

- Management Board -

Taunusanlage 12

60325 Frankfurt am Main

11 May 2015

Ref. no.: BA 5112-100003-2013/0002 (please always state)
2015/0733319

My audit order dated 13 August 2013

Audit report for the IBOR special audit by Ernst Young dated 31 March 2015
Enclosures: 1 (Audit Report)

Dear Sirs:

I am sending yoo enclosed the report on the special audit pursuant to Sec. 44 (1) sentence 2
German Banking Act [Kreditwesengesetz of the auditing firm Ernst Young on
the forensic and organizational audit of the treatment of reference interest rates and the
relevant business environment In the investment bank as well as my analysis and evaluation
of this report.

I will send you immediately a supervisory assessment, also In the overall view with other
audit reports. I already wish to advlse at this point that I will also conclusively examine
Imposing banking supervisory measures in this context which I consider to be necessary.

Overall, the audit report discloses major misconduct by varioos traders of Deutsche Bank, and
by at least one member of the management of Deutsche Bank, London Branch, as well as in
part major failures by members of the Management Board or the Group Executive Committee.
There are also substantial organizational defects in dealing with reference interest rates and in
the business environment of submissions, including the control mechanisms and the technical
infrastructure, which continued, despite what had happened previously, at least until the end
of the year beginning 2013/beglnning of the year 2014.

Although EY concludes that no indications were found that you or former members of the
Management Board as well as the GEC (cf. below with regard to the details and exceptions)
knew about manipulations by employees of DB prior to the year 2011 or instructed employees
to engage in manipulations, a business and organizational environment was created which
was favourable to Incorrect IBDR submissions or even made them possible in the first place.
The senior management of this business must face the allegations of having acted negligently
in that, by creating the corresponding environment, it favoured practices that exploited
con?icts of interest and ignored organizational duties pursuant to Sec. 25a KWG in
conjunction with MaRlsk as well as other provisions in the law. If the measures required for

proper management had been taken here in a timely manner or if the matter had at least
subsequently been dealt with differently on the whole, this could not only have been saved
immense costs for the Bank, but the trustworthiness of the Bank would not have been
harmed in such a manner, either. This is also apparent from the documents published by the
US and UK public authorities in the IBOR matter.

My ?ndings are summarized below, and 1 consider most of them to be individually, but
de?nitely in the aggregate, to be extremely serious.

1) Personal involvement of traders and managers of DB in IBOR acts constituting
manipulation

Individual traders have been proven to have engaged in consolcuous and inappropriate
communications in connection with IBOR submissions. Among the traders to be named are
the traders Christian Bittar, Guillaume Adolph, Mike Curtler, Carl Maine, Diesya Skofenko,
Ardaian Gharagozlou, Kai-Uwe Kappauf, Markus Kiekenbeck and Jtirg Vogt.

It has already been known and documented for some time that Mr. David Nicholls, who until
July 2008 was Head of Global Finance Europe and, from July 2008, Global Head of Core GFFX
and who directly reported to Mr. Alan Cioete and has no longer worked for DB since the
beginning of 2013, issued a written inappropriate instruction in at least one instance ("make
sure our ilbors are on the low side for all ccys.", cf. the Set of Exhibits, Exhibit 21) (cf. TB I,
margin no. 84 and the Audit Report by the Deutsche Bundesbank dated 9 November 2012,
Senior Management Review, margin no. 39). Although Mr. Nicholis was not a member of the
Management Board or a member of the GEC, this must be considered to be a serious matter
due to his position and the harmful effect of such a senior instruction within the hierarchy of
DB.

Proof that Mr. Cioete knew about acts of manipulation by DB traders even prior to 2011 was
not provided by Eli. However, according to EY, the very close informal communication
between Mr. Cioete and Mr. Nicholls must also be considered, as a result of which EY states
that it cannot exclude the possibility that Mr. Cioete already knew about manipulations by
employees of DB even prior to June 2011 (TB 1, margin no. 99). Further, EY concludes that,
considering the further fact that Mr. Nicholls, according to his own statements, always kept
Mr. Cioete informed about the trading strategy and the assumed risk, which normally
occurred on specific occasions and generally personally because they had their of?ces directly
next to each other in London, it is even likely that Mr. Cioete knew about the directive from
Mr. Nicholls to Mr. Curtler in October 2007 - "make sure our libors are on the low side for all
ccys." - or that Mr. Cioete might even himself have issued this directive.(cf. TB I, margin no.
84).

With regard to Me Falssola, EY states that there are lndicatons (consisting of an analysis by
the trader Shivanl Mathur about the arbitrary nature of the IBOR submissions by DB and
other panel banks) that the possibility cannot be excluded, in any event, that he also knew
about manipulations prior to 2011 (TB I, margin no. 71).

According to the statement made to DB and EY by Ms. Mathur, Mr. Falssola asked her in 2008
to transmit her trading positions to the trading colleagues at the Frankfurt Cash Desk who
were Involved with IBOR submissions so that the corresponding positions - in addition to the
purpose of hedging - could also be taken into account in the context of EURIBOR submissions
(the intention of Ms. Mathur is not reflected in T8 I, margin nos. 862 et seqq., but this Is
proven by DB record and documented In the EY interview). Thus, there Is a further indication

that Mr. Falssola could have known about the manipulations by DB traders already In 2008. A
further aspect is that he might even have supported the manipulations by making the request
to the trader Mathur. In a discussion I conducted with Mr. Falssola in our of?ces on
23 March 2015, I learned that Mr. Falssola denies any memory about a corresponding request
to Ms. Mathur and points out that the transmission oftrading positions to the Cash Desk was
common In the context of hedging. I also understood from his statement that he had only
been concerned with hedging risks as far as Ms. Mathur was concerned and that he had never
discussed 180R submissions with her, particularly since his position in the hierarchy had been
four levels above that of Ms. Mathur and he therefore hardly had had any contact with her.

The above ?ndings and suspicious facts give me particular cause for worry and raise
considerable concerns especially in light of the fact that Mr. Cloete and Mr. Falssola are GEC
members of DB who work at a sensitive place at DB and, therefore, should be above all
suspicion. In my view, and in accordance with the assessment by with regard to
Mr. Cloete, there remain major doubts related to his personal knowledge of manipulations, or
even his instruction to engage in manipulations, prior to June 2011. There remain also doubts
with regard to Mr. Falssola.

2) Knowledge of employees of DB about discussions in the market concerning the
possibility of manipulations of the LIBOR in 2007/2008

The ?ndings of EY show that, in the ?rst half of 2008, there were rumors and discussions in
the market about LIBOR submissions which deviated from the market, and about the
susceptibility of the LIBOR to manipulation and that at 08, among others, Mr. Cloete,
Mr. Nicholls, Mr. Faissoia, Mr. Mr. Curtler and Mr. worked on this topic
and also informed Mr. Jain as the person responsible for GM and, thus, also the GFFX division,
about this T8 I, margin nos. 511 et seqq.). The following findings of fact show how
urgent it would have been already In 2008 to Investigate the GFFX division with regard to the
possibility of acts by Its traders which manipulated LIBOR but Such an investigation was not
conducted. Furthermore, they show that Mr. Jain had been Informed already in 2008 about
the In the market relating to the susceptibility of the LIBOR to manipulation.

Mr. Falssola reported to Mr. Jain for the ?rst time, according to the information available to
EY about LIBOR submissions which deviated from the market by e-mall dated
21 August 2007 after Mr. Falssola had forwarded to Mr. Jian e-mall correspondence that had
been conducted previously with Mr. (TB 1, margin no. 511 and Set of Exhibits,
Exhibit 1).

In an e-mail dated 7 March 2008, Mr. Nicholls informed Mr. Jain, Mr. Cloete and Mr. Falssola
that the Interbank markets were moving In a divergent direction and that there were banks
which were trying to obtain liquidity for up to 50 basis points above the reference interest rate
they had determined (cf. TB 1, margin no. 518 and Set of Exhibits, Exhibit 2). The necessary
conclusion based on this Information was that banks had reported reference rates which were
too low.

An article appeared In the Wall Street Journal ("Bankers cast doubt on key rate amid crisis";
Set of Exhibits, Exhibit 3) on 16 April 2008 In which there was a report about the concerns of
market participants with regard to the reliability of the this involved and
in one paragraph also the possibility of transmitting false Interest rates In order to profit from
derivative transactions as well as the possibility of collusion among banks If a sufficient
number of institutions coordinated their conduct (Set of Exhibits, Exhibit 3; cf. also, TB I,

margin nos. 519-522). In an e-mail dated 16 April 2008, the WSJ article was sent by
Mr. Krishna Memani internally within the bank to an unknown group of recipients (TB 1,
margin no. 523). This was followed by e-maii communications concerning this WSJ article
between Mr. Boaz Weinstein and Mr. Alan Cloete; Mr. Cloete stated that the LIBOR no longer
represented a realistic ratio (TB I, margin nos. 523?525).

On 17 April 2008, there was a telephone call between Mr. David Nicholls, Mr. Mike Curtler and
Mr. John Ewan of the BBA in which Mr. Nicholls referred to the above WSJ article. Mr. Nicholls
stated, contrary to his better knowledge, that the WSJ article contained wrong information
and that there could be no talk about any traders manipulating the LIBOR in order to
maximize pro?t or banks working together In a collusive manner (TB 1, margin nos. 529-
535).

The discussion about the calculation of the LIBOR that made the rounds in the market
following the WSJ article was the subject of two e-mails from Mr. Cloete to Mr. Jain on
20 April 2008 and 15 May 2008: Mr. Cloete referred in his e-malls to the rumors about the
LIBOR noise about how libor noise around the LIBOR
cf. TB 1, margin nos. 538-540). This shows that Mr. Jain was informed
about the LIBOR discussion in the market in the first half of the year 2008.

A meeting of the BBA took place in May 2008 with the LIBOR panel banks concerning the
issue of changing the submission process, and DB was represented by Mr. Nicholls and Mr.
Curtier. In advance of the meeting, Mr. Cloete, Mr. Faissola, Mr. Aidington and Mr. Nicholls
had agreed that, in the view of DB, the changes in the ?xing of the LIBOR should be as small
as possible (TB I, margin nos. 553 et seq.; especially margin nos. 557-560 and 565 as well as
the Set of Exhibits, Exhibit 7).

Global Markets Research sent a report with the title "Repairing Libor" to a distribution list on
the 27 June 2008, including also to Mr. Jain and Mr. Faissola. The report concerns the
pending notification of the BBA concerning the result of its investigation of LIBOR ?xing.
Reference is also made In the report to the possibility that banks were submitting Incorrect
submissions and the possibility of collusive conduct by banks, both of which, however, were
considered to be unlikely. However, this report again raised the issue about the possibility of
manipulating the LIBOR, even though this was considered to be improbable (TB I, margin
nos. 572 et seq.).

In view of the discussion about the reliability of the LIBOR, on 1 June 2008,
Mr. Timothy Geithner regional head of the Fed at the time, submitted recommendations to the
Bank of England for preventing unintentional or intentional incorrect submissions (TB I,
margin nos. 567). Dr. Leithner stated on this point in an e-mail of 20 February 2013 to
Mr. Michael Golden, which he also fonvarded on the same day to Mr. Jain, that It would be
better if these recommendations by Timothy Geithner and the discussion about the LIBOR
conducted in 2008 were not mentioned to the press because otherwise the question would be
raised about why nobody at DB had reacted at that time (TB 1, margin nos. 187; 687-691;
766).

On 10 June 2008, Mr. Jain met with representatives of the Bank of England; he was informed
in advance of this meeting by Mr. Charles Aidington that he would also be asked about LIBOR
(TB 1, margin nos. 577 et seq.). At the request of Mr. Aldington, Mr. Cloete informed Mr. Jain
about the results of a meeting of Mr. Nicholls with the BBA in Apri12008 prior to Mr. Jain's
meeting with the Bank of England; Mr. Cloete again referred in his e?mail to incorrect LIBOR

submissions by Individual banks and explained that the BBA had examined possibilities of
modifying the LIBOR submission process, for example, by increasing the number of panel
banks TB 1, margin nos. 107 and Set of Exhibits, Exhibit 12), Mr. Jain stated to EY that
he could not remember whether the LIBOR issue had been discussed at the meeting with the
Bank of England (TB 1, margin no. 103).

In November 2008, Ms. Shivani Mathur, a trader in the Rates division at DB, prepared an
analysis about the random nature of submissions of Deutsche Bank and other panel
banks ("Analysis of the randomness of the interbank offered rate submissions of DB and other
panel banks"), in which she concluded the EURIBOR rates had been transmitted initially by DB
and subsequently by French banks which, in part, were substantially below the corresponding
average rates of the EURIBOR. She transmitted this analysis to Mr. Michele Falssola.
Ms. Mathur stated to EY that she had prepared the analysis in order to justify the results in
her trading books for her superiors (TB 1, margin nos. 600 et seqq.).

As mentioned above, the stated facts clearly show that It would already have been necessary
for DB in 2008 to conduct an investigation of the GFFX business with regard to the possibility
of LIBOR manipulations.

3) Organizational parameters and environment surrounding the IBOR submission

The ?ndings concerning the subject matter of the organizational parameters and the
environment for the IBOR submissions show that, starting in the year 2007, there was a
business culture and a general framework shaped by the management at least up to the level
of Mr. Jain and Mr. Cloete which favoured problematic communications and (attempted) IBOR
manipulation. The role of Mr. Cloete appears to be predominant and problematic in several
respects. However, this also applies to Mr. Jain, albeit at a higher and less direct level of
responsibility.

The goal of the reorganization of the seating order in the trading division in London in the
year 2005, which resulted in traders and submitters sitting together, was to achieve an open
communication between both functions, especially also with regard to the LIBOR. The
reorganization of the GFFX sector was initiated by Mr. Jain who was also decisively
responsible for this; Mr. Cloete implemented the reorganization.

There is a connection with regard to timing between the reorganization of the GFFX division
(with the HMO desk), the change in the trading strategy up to making intense use of IBOR
spreads and the generation of pro?ts in a range which had never been realized previously (or
afterwards). Although the auditors of EY conclude that they could not Identify any direct
causal connection between the reorganization of the business division and the generation of
particularly high trading results (TB 1, margin no. 975), I am of the view, based on the facts
identified by EY and the close relationship entwined between the changed seating order in the
trading room in London and the generated higher profits, that - In addition to the new trading
strategy and the changed situation In the market - also the reorganization of the trading
division (with the Improved possibility for communication between traders and submitters)
was at least an indirect cause of higher profits and favoured this development. The stated
indirect effect is seen in the fact that the control environment of the bank in the GFFX division
was by far not sufficient to prevent con?icts of interest and the exploitation of these con?icts
of interest, be it in the context of trading transactions or In connection with attempted
exercise of in?uence on reference interest rates.

The MMD desk had substantially higher earnings in the period between August 2007 and
March/April 2010 than had been previously or subsequently generated. There was a
significant increase in the for the ?rst time in August 2007. The profits were particularly
drastic in 2008 (EUR 1.9 billion). The pro?ts were also clearly increased at EUR1.0 billion in
2009 (TB I, margin nos. 900 et seq). Mr. Jain knew the trading strategy and the trading

result of the MMD desk at the latest starting on 30 August 2007. 'Mr. Cioete explained to him
the trading strategy of the MMD desk and indicated that, especially the trader Christian Bitter
had been very successful (TB 1. margin no. 905).

The high pro?ts of the MMD desk were the subject of two internal investigations at the bank.
These investigations conducted by Mr. Broeksmit and the Business Integrity Review Group
(BIRG), however, were not completely independent, not comprehensive and did not go deep
enough. As a result of the so called Broeksmit investigation, ordered by Mr. Jain in
January 2009, assorance was supposed to be obtained that the pro?ts of the MMD desk/of
Mr. Bitter were real and had not been caused by false valuations 0r Internal transactions (TB
I, margin nos. 910 et seq.). It must be noted In this regard that It would have been
mandatory, in my view, to examine the profits under the aspect of compliance and potential
IBOR manipulation and not just as to whether these pro?ts were real and did not exist only on
paper. In the interest of the "?rst line of defence", Mr. Jain should have triggered a
comprehensive compliance check and, if applicable, an investigation as quickly as possible.

Mr. Ritchotte requested the BIRG investigation; he stated to EY that so much money had
never been earned before and that it was a cardinal rule in risk management that there was
cause for concern if a great amount of money was earned or if a great amount of money was
lost. BIRG was supposed to look for fraud in this situation (TB I, margin no. 913), but BIRG
found nothing (on this point, see below), despite an analysis of communications date,
including also Mr. Bittar's suspicious communications.

In addition to the physical parameters, there were also speci?c instructions by Mr. NichoiIs in
the trading division which promoted agreements and improper conduct In violation of con?icts
of interest and compliance requirements. EY found that traders at the MMD desk in London
were required by David Nicholls to regularly communicate with traders at the
Frankfurt Cash Desk (TB 1, margin no. 369). The assertions by Mr. Kappauf, as one of four
Frankfurt traders at the Cash Desk who were dismissed by DB on the basis of manipulations
of IBOR and who for their part state that they were instructed by DB to regularly
communicate with the MMD desk in London, must also be mentioned. He informed EY that,
from 2005 onwards, the communications between traders in Frankfurt and London greatly
increased. especially when Mr. Andreas Heuschiid Ie? as Head of GF Continental Europe at the
end of 2006 (TB 1, margin no. 871). Mr. Bitter stated to EY that all reference interest rates
had been Openly discussed between derivatives and cash traders and that the tables for the
traders had been arranged in such manner so that this communication was possible with the
full knowledge of senior management (TB I. margin no. 871); he said that conflicts of interest
had twen ignored, and was not able to recall that concerns had been expressed with regard to
compliance (TB I, margin no. 872).

There are also clear indications that the bonus-driven compensation system gave rise to or
reinforced an interest of traders In certain developments in the Interest rates and that the
trading strategy established by the management of the trading division additionally furthered
this interest.

The conflicts of Interest that arose between traders and submitters as a result of the lack of
separation of the functions and the circumstance that the compensation system established a
particular incentive for exploiting these conflicts of interest, in my view, should have been
recognized by the senior management of DB, at least to the extent that the management
responsible for the trading division is_ concerned. According to the ?ndings of EY, such
con?icts of interest were actively triggered or reinforced as a result of the new organizational
structure of the GFFX division. in view of the facts described above, I do not share the
assessment by the auditors that the corresponding conflicts of interest had "not been
recognized by senior management" (TB I, margin no. 973).

It must be noted that it was primarily the trader Christian Bitter who generated the
extraordinary pro?ts and that attention had been drawn to him also as a result of conspicuous
communications and thus attempted manipulations. Even If no connection can be proven
between the suspicious communications and the extraordinary high profits, there are many
indications that - In addition to the new trading strategy starting in 2008 and the greater
differences between short-term and long-term LIBDR rates resulting from the ?nancial crisis 
in any event, the problematic communications or even attempted manipulations were also the
reason for the enormous trading results.

According to my assessment, the relationship of Mr. Bitter to his superiors was quite
remarkable. Mr. Bitter was the predominant trader in the GFFX division and was also treated
accordingly. Mr. Jaln, who was Global Head of Global Markets in 2008, knew and promoted
Mr. Bitter and supported Mr. Bittar's entitlement to a bonus before Dr. Ackermann, as is
apparent from a telephone call between Mr. Jain and Dr. Ackermann on 7 January 2007 in
which Mr. Jeln referred to Christian Bitter and Carl Maine, among other words, as 
guys, they are the best people on the street" and best guys we have got" (T8 1, margin
nos. 120; 1281).

Mr. Jain himself had obviously approved the earnings-based bonus, which Mr. Bitter received
from 2004, within 24 hours in light of the fact that Mr. Bitter wanted to give notice of
termination due to an offer he had from a competitor (TB 1, margin nos. 1249 et seq.).
Mr. Jain Informed Dr. Ackermenn about great profits ("mountain of money") in the telephone
call on 7 January 2009 TB 1, margin nos. 1281 et seq.) and that, as a consequence, the
extremely high bonus claim of Mr. Bitter and Mr. Maine In a total of EUR 130 million had been
agreed and that half of the bonus claim was supposed to be paid out only in the next year.
He referred to Mr. Bitter as a ?guaranteed money maker" (TB 1, margin nos. 120; 1282).

Attention is drawn to the coincidence in terms of time between sending Mr. Bitter to
Singapore at the beginning of 2010 and the ?rst inquiries from regulators on
13 January 2010 and 5 February 2010 (by the SEC). EY also states in this regard that no
communication could be Identi?ed supporting the allegation made by Mr. Bitter that he had
already asked for a transfer to Singapore In 2007 (TB 1, margin no. 1234).

The enormous increase in the trading profits of Mr. Bitter and, thus, also the enormous
increase in his bonus entitlements coincide in terms of time with the restructuring of the GFFX
division. The question accordingly arises as to whether and to what extent the restructuring
of the division by Mr. Jain and Mr. Cloete was Specifically made in order to give, among
others, Mr. Bitter the possibility of directly communicating with the submitters and accordingly
achieving higher trading profits. In any event, the coincidence in timing between the physical
changes in the GGFX division and the substantially increased trading profits at DB Is
remarkable.

It follows from the contradictory statements of Mr. Cioete and Mr. Bitter concerning the
content of their private discussions in a London hotel in the context of the dismissal of
Mr. Bitter that either Mr. Cioete made untruthful statements to EY or that Mr. Bittar or his
attorneys made untruthfui statements in their letters to DB. According to the allegations by
the attorneys of Mr. Bitter, which Mr. Cioete disputes, Mr. Cioete supposedly informed
Mr. Bitter that he (Mr. Bitter) had not done anything wrong and that he was instead a victim
of "all these internal and external politics" (TB I, margin no. 1326). This statement of
Mr. Bitter - assuming that it is true - can be an indication that Mr. Cioete knew about the
attempted manipulations on the part of Mr. Bitter already at that time.

It is remarkable in this context that also three of the four Frankfurt IBOR traders who were
dismissed by DB and who ?led complaints against the termination of employment made
statements which, assuming that they are correct, could give rise to the conclusion that
Mr. Cioete was involved In the false submissions, that he had no interest in changing the
process and taking consequences, that he was not convinced of the necessity of an
investigation or substantive changes and that he only acted because he saw no other way to
avoid being drawn into the focus of the investigations. The fact that this conclusion is
everything other than remote despite the statements that have been disputed by Mr. Cioete is
also apparent in the overall view of the elements of suspicion concerning Mr. Cioete in the
discussion about his responsibilities below. In any event, this raises substantial doubts about
the beiievablilty of Mr. Cioete as a result of the overall impressions and the large number of
contradictory statements.

4) Reporting lines and controls in the trading division in the context of the IBOR
submissions

In terms of risk management and control environment, there were considerable deficits in the
GFFX division (and, within such division, in the MMD Desk), which was re5ponsible for the
IBOR submissions. The findings of EY, of which only the main facts are dealt with below, lead
to the inevitable conclusion that this business division was obviously focused on the
maximization of profit with a claim to almost absolute validity, without, however, putting In
place any even remotely well-matched control. As a result of the lack of balance created by
the management, this paved the way for an environment which would urgently have required
strong control functions and a corresponding risk management culture not only because of
statutory, especially regulatory, requirements but also in the bank's own Interest in an
effective risk management. Moreover, an early investigation and analysis that were not
merely superficial or even possibly biased in finding the results would have been Imperative.

EY arrives at the following conclusions with regard to the reporting and responsibility lines
which, according to the regulatory authority's understanding, constitute the basic framework
for initial control and responsibility in the first line of defense:

The written reporting lines were in part incomplete and contradictory and the everyday
practice deviated from the prescribed structure (TB 1, margin nos. 1161 et seq.). No
requirements or standards existed on the monitoring of the trading activities and no further
specification was given by the GFFX division (as from 2012: FIC), either (TB 1, margin
no. 1163). Implemented control tools, such as trader mandates, were used only to a limited
extent and also the performance management process, which served to assess employees,
was implemented quite differently at various hierarchy levels and locations (TB 1, margin no.
1164).

The focus in the GFFX division was clearly on the business figures and not on compliance by
the employees. EY bases this conclusion on the fact that a number of individuals in the GFFX
division, including Mr. Curtier, Mr. Bittar and Mr. Nicholls, did not complete their mandatory
compliance training (TB 1, margin no. 1057). The employees' conduct is reflected by their
superiors. For example, EY found that the completion of the mandatory trainings by
employees was not effectively monitored although the senior management, namely
Mr. Jain and Mr. Cioete, knew that these mandatory trainings did not receive the required
attention (TB I, margin no. 1164).

Regarding the intensity with which management and senior management were involved in the
handling of trading strategies and risk positions EY notes as follows:

The reporting lines in the context of the IBDR submissions provide information on areas of
responsibility and monitoring obligations, in particular under the aspect of suf?cient risk
controls. In this context, It becomes clear that the control environment at DB, which was
particularly important due to the high risks in the trading division, was characterized by
considerable weaknesses. This, in turn, facilitated and fostered the problematic conduct by
individual traders in respect of certain trading strategies depending on reference rates and in
respect of conflict-prone conduct surrounding communications and submissions. it thus had
both a direct and indirect impact on the IBOR submissions.

Here, too, Mr. Cioete is in a prominent position and bears a particular responsibility in several
respects. This also applies at least in part, and again at an even higher level of re5ponsibility,
to Mr. Jain.

EY ?nds that the undiSputed reporting line relevant for the present investigation led from
Mr. David Nicholls via Mr. Alan Cioete to Mr. Anshu Jain and, until 2009, from the latter to
Dr. Josef Ackermann (TB I, margin no. 1034).

According to Mr. Blttar, Mr. Cioete changed the original organizational structure of the GFFX
division, which was based on product lines, to an organizational structure based on
geographical criteria. He added that the reporting lines were difficult to depict in an
organization chart (TB 1, margin no. 1033).

During the period investigated by EY (January 2007 until June 2013), Mr. Jain, Mr. Cioete and
Mr. Nicholls were informed on a daily basis by way of a formal reporting of the risk positions
and in particular the developments in the GFFX division (TB 1, margin no. 1084).

Mr. Bittar stated to EY that he had spoken in person with Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Cioete when
necessary (TB 1. margin no. 1086). Mr. Nicholls told EY that, in the years 2007 to 2009, he
had more regular contact than before with Mr. Jain In the context of GMEC meetings. He
added that, outside of that committee, communications to Mr. Jain had been via Mr. Cioete
(TB 1, margin no. 1092).

Mr. Nicholls held so-called "Monday Risk Calls", in which traders from London, New York,
Tokyo and Frankfurt who reported to Mr. Nicholis discussed with each other and with their
supervisor the market events as well as their trading strategy and trading positions.
Mr. Nicholls Issued clear instructions to the traders on how to proceed in these calls (TB I,
margin nos. 1096 et seqq.).

Mr. Cioete's workspace was in the immediate vicinity of Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Bitter. There
were regular conversations between Mr. Cioete and Mr. Nicholls and ad hoc conversations

about certain topics between Mr. Cloete and Mr. Bittar (TB 1, margin nos. 1104 et seq.).
Mr. Bittar told EY that there was no direct reporting line to Mr. Jain but that he had met him
several times (TB I, margin no. 1107).

In summary, EY ?nds that the senior management, Mr. Jain, Mr. Cloete and Mr. Nicholls,
dealt with the trading positions of the GFFX division on a daily and event-driven basis, mostly
orally and at a bilateral level (TB I, margin no. 1111). Mr. Cloete and Mr. Jain regularly
monitored the trading positions and the developments thereof in the GFFX division. In
contrast, EY has not found any indications of any direct involvement of Dr. Ackermann in the
monitoring of the trading activities (TB 1, margin no. 1145).

In risk management, several de?cits existed in the relevant period according to various
investigations. According to an investigation by Oliver Wyman In 2007, there were, among
other things, methodological weaknesses in risk measurement and de?cits In risk monitoring;
Deutsche Bundesbank identi?ed in 2009 a number of organizational and structural deficits,
including with regard to the processes for monitoring market price risks, and McKinsey
criticized, also in 2009, that in particular successful divisions were not suf?ciently scrutinized
(TB 1, margin no. 923). Moreover, the of the GFFX division exceeded the statutory 
limit as from November 2008 for several months (TB I, margin no. 932). In addition,
Mr. Cloete expressly permitted Mr. Bittar to continue pursuing his trading strategy, including
the high risks associated therewith, although Mr. Bittar frequently exceeded the limits
prescribed by the risk function ("Keep going you doing great", TB I, margin nos. 1114 et
seq.). Mr. Bittar's supervisors (Mr. Nicholls, Mr. Cloete and Mr. Jain) were aware of and
tolerated the fact that Mr. Bittar regularly exceeded trading limits (TB 1, margin no. 1116).

As regards organizational and procedural responsibilities, an at least indirect responsibility of
Mr. Cloete for the IBOR manipulations can be assumed. This conclusion also applies to
Mr. Jain, albeit at an even higher level of responsibility.

Also the subsequent control and investigation of suspicious and presumably compliance-
relevant facts and circumstances is in dire need of Improvement.

The BIRG MMD review, for example, was not a complete or, considering the Interference from
the trading division, independent analysis (TB 11, margin no. 190). The investigation was
incomplete because the list of search terms used for the analysis of communications was not
applied consistently to all data and to the entire period Investigated, which constitutes a
deviation from a forensic approach (TB II, margin no. 174). The investigation was evidently
Incomplete also because the suspicious communications subsequently discovered (of
Mr. Bitter, among others) were precisely not detected in the communication analysis. The
explanation given by employees of DB to Mr. Ritchotte, who could not understand why the
BIRG review had not discovered any indications of IBOR manipulations, was that many of the
suspicious communications had been In French or languages other than English and had
therefore not been identi?ed (TB II, margin no. 59). EY found that the entire communication
analysis (a total of 830,000 documents) was conducted by Mr. Mulcany alone (TB II, margin
no. 61), who also analyzed the communications In French despite not having command of the
language (TB II, margin no. 175).

EY believes that the Involvement of Mr. Cloete as head of the Investigated division in the
Investigation by Internal Audit can be regarded as conspicuous (TB 11, margin no. 191).
Consequently, the BIRG review did not in any way constitute an independent investigation by
Internal Audit.

According to my opinion, no plausible reasons are discernible why the head of a division which
is being investigated by Internal Audit should interfere with the preparation of the report to
an extent which is described as conspicuous even by employees of Internal Audit. This holds
true all the more so for the fact that he glossed over contents of the report, which is, in fact,
not tolerable from a bank-internal perspective, but even less so from a regulatory
perspective. This should also have been noticed by DB, since even the lawyers of
Slaughter May mandated by your legal department arrived at the conclusion that
Mr. Cloete's changes were to be deemed as euphemistic and afterwards required attenuation
by Internal Audit. Therefore, the statements made by Mr. Cloete on the BIRG complex to the
effect that he had not been competent to make any changes to the BIRG report hardly sound
convincing to EY. This also appears problematic considering the function held by Mr. Cioete at
DB.

Besides Mr. Cloete, also Mr. Jain was interested in the preliminary results of the BIRG review.
In this context, further conspicuous aspects can be established. It Is not comprehensible, for
example, why compliance-relevant results of the review were presented to Mr. Jain on
30 November 2009 which were kept from the Management Board in a presentation of
8 December 2009, although such information was provided subsequently on 19 January 2010
(TB 11, margin no. 134).

The explanation given by Mr. Kahlberg for the long time that had been needed to prepare the
BIRG report fails to convince. There is good reason to assume that the delay was mainly due
to the time-consuming coordination of the draft report, in particular with Mr. Cloete.
Mr. Cloete's interference with the preparation of a report by Internal Audit, which went far
beyond a legitimate coordination of the facts, is deemed highly problematic particularly under
regulatory aspects but certainly also under bank-intemal aspects and leaves questions
regarding his role and regarding the reactions which would, in fact, have had to be taken in
his and Mr. Jaln's area of responsibility unanswered.

In January 2011, DB untruthfully con?rmed to the BBA that a corresponding review of the
LIBOR submission processes had had occurred in 2010 In accordance with the BBA
requirements (TOR), which was not the case (see TB 11, margin nos. 194 et seqq.). With
respect to personal responsibilities for the issuance of the incorrect BBA confirmation for the
year 2010, EY arrives at the following conclusions: Mr Curtier from the GFFX division knew of
the BBA requirement to conduct and subsequently confirm controls of the submission process
as early as mid-2009. As a DB representative at BBA, he himself took part In meetings in
which the LIBOR-related BBA requirements were discussed (TB Ii, margin no. 211). Further,
one might have expected from Ms. Nott as UK Regional Head of Group Audit and C13 Business
partner that she, following receipt of the BBA's request for a confirmation of control, would
have spent more time dealing with the contents of the request rather than with the questions
as to who at DB should issue the confirmation (TB II, margin no. 342), a task ?nally
accomplished by Mr. Jackson from the Compliance division (TB 11, margin no. 344).

in light of the facts and assessments set out above, it can only be concluded with a view to
the finding explained in the introduction that a strict risk management and control
environment at all lines of defense, but in particular in the trading division itself (first line of
defense), at least would have significantly impeded, If not even entirely precluded, any
improper conduct.

5) Further organizational issues relating to submissions

in connection with the bank-intemal Investigation of the IBOR processes, the EV auditors
have established further serious procedural deficits beyond the numerous findings regarding
such investigation that are described In the separate audit report that has been available to
you for some time. In summary, such de?cits concern the handling of the communications
platform Reuters Dealing 3000, the deletion of audio ?les and the answering of inquiries from
regulatory authorities in connection with your internal investigation.

a) Reuters Dealing 3000

EY finds that not all relevant sources of communication were taken into account in the course
of the bank-internal IBOR investigation led by DB Legal or were made available for third-party
investigations (TB 11, margin no.401). The reason for this was that not all existing platforms
and software programs offering communication functions were taken into account In the
EMARS data storage system, from which the sources of communication used for the internal
investigation were extracted. This is due to the fact that, prior to September 2013,
there was no uniform process for Identifying platforms and software offering communication
functions at DB and no periodic checks of EMARS had been implemented (TB 11, margin no.
404).

This constitutes a serious omission for which various functions and persons at DB bear joint
responsibility due to their own respective omissions.

The omission is, ?rst of all, attributable to the GT 0 division, in which the so-called EMARS
team was responsible for Identifying communication applications in EMARS (TB 11, margin nos.
394; 400). However, the team was not explicitly given the task to also control whether
EMARS comprised all sources of communication (TB 11, margin no. 404). Despite the fact that
EY has no indications that GT 0 deliberately withheld information from DB Legal in the course
of the bank-internal IBOR investigation on unrecorded communication applications (TB II,
margin no. 394), Mr. Ritchotte and the former Management Board member Mr. Lamberti have
to face the allegation of not having implemented any corresponding measures for ensuring
completeness of EMARS in the beginning.

Further, it must be established that the Group Audit division did not check the completeness
of the communication data in EMARS, either; Group Audit was initially managed by Mr. Giles
(2005?2011) and Ms. Kaur (2011-2013) and thereafter by Mr. Falk (April-June 2013) and
Mr. Sewing (since June 2013) (TB Ii, margin no. 396) Only after DB obtained knowledge of
EMARS being incomplete in 2013 were corresponding measures taken (among other things,
conduct of an internal and external investigation of the circumstances of the incompleteness
of EMARS and introduction of a process for analyzing the communication functions of new
software applications) (TB II, margin no, 397). According to EY's assessment, such measures
were adequate and goal-oriented (TB II, margin no. 408).

DB Legal did not check the completeness of the sources of communication provided by GT 0
either. As OB Legal was responsible for DB's internal IBOR investigation, DB Legal or the
Management Board members responsible for this area (until 31 May 2012: Dr. Banziger, since
then: Dr. Leithner) were therefore responsible for the incomplete analysis of all relevant
sources of communication (TB II, margin nos. 392; 401). Even though, according to EY, there
are no facts indicating that DB Legal knew that EMARS was incomplete or that DB Legal

deliberately excluded certain sources of communication from the bank-Internal IBOR
investigation (TB 11, margin no. 393), considering the importance of the investigations, DB
Legal would have been responsible for checking the completeness of the sources.

However, in addition to the foregoing and in addition to EY's conclusions, I believe that also
'the trading division itself should have questioned whether 'all sources of communication were
available to DB Legal in the bank-internal investigation and to regulators in their respective
external IBOR investigations. 0n the one hand, Mr. Jain and Mr. Cloete, too, should have
been interested in completely and thoroughly clarifying the IBOR issues. The aim should have
been to eliminate any existing de?ciencies at least subsequently and to take corresponding
organizational as well as personnel?related measures. On the other hand, at least Mr. Jain
must also have been aware that, in the course of external audits, DB would have to issue
attestations of completeness on a regular basis for which, in the specific IBOR issue, he would
most likely have to share the responsibility.

b) Deletion of audio ?les

Contrary to the order issued in May 2011 by the FSA, the British supervisory authority at the
time, to retain for investigation purposes any and all data and information on LIBOR, including
telephone recordings, available as from 2006, audio ?les that were potentially relevant for the
LIBOR investigation were destroyed in July 2012 (TB II, margin ms, 428; 435 et seq.). Even
though EY comes to the conclusion that there were no facts indicating that these audio files of
the years 2008/2009 had been deleted deliberately and intentionally, the deletion is the result
of deficiencies in the relevant processes (TB II, margin no. 451) which I consider to be
serious. The deletion of these files constitutes an unacceptable event, because they related to
facts which were relevant for clarifying the circumstances underlying the investigations and
which were withheld from the review by various supervisory authorities.

According to EY's findings, the deletion was due to the fact that, although the IPV Voice Team,
which is part of GTO and responsible for the retention of audio files, had been instructed
immediately in May 2011 to exempt all audio ?les available with respect to the LIBOR
submissions from the standard deletion process (TB II, margin nos. 41?; 441; 448), the IPV
Voice Team assumed, however, that this instruction only related to the audio flies of the
preceding six months, which is the usual retention period applicable at DB for such ?ies. As a
result, in July 2012, audio ?les originating mainly from the years 2003 and 2009 were deleted
which DB had retained in connection with the Lehman crisis and the contents of which might
also have been relevant to LIBOR (TB 11, margin no. 449). This can only have been caused by
deficiencies in communication at DB as well as by a possible lack of or by an unclear allocation
of responsibilities, which means that there must be severe organizational deficits.

In this context, Mr. Lamberti, who was the Management Board member responsible for GTO
at the time the data request was received from the FSA, must face the serious reproach of not
having Implemented adequate processes to ensure an appropriate data storage. 0n the other
hand, I cannot see any relevant responsibility on the part of Mr. Richotte considering that he
had been appointed to the Management Board only shortly before.

I have noticed that you reacted to his incident in October 2013 and that, according to EY,
corresponding measures were taken immediately which are appropriate (TB II, margin no.
457).

c) Incorrect content of the Information given to regulators and to the BBA

in various cases, DB gave incorrect information to regulators and to the BBA - for the most
part to the FSA, the FCA and the BBA) even knowingly. These cases constitute severe
breaches of the duty to provide true and correct information to regulators.

By order of 4 February 2011, the FSA requested that you confirm the appropriateness of your
processes and controls relating to LIBDR submissions in place at the time; you were
requested to con?rm that you had appropriate policies and rules in place that were
satisfactory to senior management. Thereupon on 17 March 2011, Mr. Andrew Sowter
(Compliance) issued the written confirmation - which was incorrect as to its content that
Compliance had performed random controls and, together with Mr. Cloete and Mr. Nicholle,
considered the processes to be appropriate. Mr. Cloete stated in this context to EY that he
had not seen the confirmation at the time, whereas Mr. Simon Jackson told EY that the draft
version of the letter had been presented to Mr. Cloete and Mr. Nicholls for review. As regards
the content of the con?rmation, EY states that in fact none of the controls speci?ed in BBA's
TOR had been implemented until mid-2011 (TB 11, margin nos. 939 et seqq.; cf. also margin
nos. 34? et seqq.).

You also made incorrect statements to BaFin in your letter of 23 August 2013. In that letter
to BaFin, you stated that Mr. Christian Bitter was not involved in the ISDAFIX (cf. in this
regard TB 11, margin nosmargin nos. 194 201). The reason for this
Incorrect information was that your internal investigations were super?cial and insuf?cient.
Both the insufficient bank-internal investigation and your incon-ect letter to BaFin of
23 August 2013 fall within the responsibility of Dr. Leithner as the Management Board
member responsible for Legal - and Mr. Lewis as co-signatory (cf. TB I, margin nos. 194 -
201).

in connection with statements made to regulators which were incorrect as to their contents,
the incorrect BBA con?rmation of 12 January 2011 is also to be mentioned (see above).

Furthermore, the incorrect allegation made by DB to the FCA In 2013 although not
addressed in the EY Report - is also to be seen in this context. DB incorrectly informed the
FCA that BaFin had prohibited the release of the EV audit report of 22 March 2013 to the FCA.
This incorrect statement to FCA is described in detail by the FCA in its Draft Warning Notice
delivered to DB on 17 March 2015 and In its Final Notice of 23 April 2015 on IBOR, to which
reference is made hereby.

It goes without saying that, in my view, incorrect statements to supervisory authorities are
totally unacceptable In any circumstances and evidence of an intolerable state. The
statement to the BBA, too, Is problematic and an indication of a very poor compliance culture.
Furthermore, it Is not discernible to me that these issues have been investigated and analyzed
or that conclusions have been drawn accordingly at DB, which would have been urgently
required in my view.

6) Proper ISDAFIX and IBDR submission processes

a) submission processes

The ISDAFIX submission process, which was part of Mr. Jain's area of responsibility, was only
insufficiently equipped and protected against manipulations, although since 2010 at the latest,
i.e. the date on which attempted manipulations were identified for the first time without any

consequences (cf. TB 11, margin no. 909), there would have been reason to also examine this
aspect of the submissions. In this context, it is to be considered as particularly serious that
Mr. Jain and the other senior managers responsible for GFFX at DB obviously did not draw any
conclusions from previous events, in particular from the outcome and the analysis of the
investigations on reference-rates conducted so far, for themselves or for their respective
areas of responsibility even though it was clear that this would have been necessary.
In particular, prior to shutting down the ISDAFIX submission by DB in April 2014, it could not
be determined that Mr. Jain, Mr. Faissoia and Mr. Cloete took all necessary action to establish
proper ISDAFIX processes. This means that Mr. Jain, Mr. Faissola and Mr. Cloete did not even
react upon receipt of the BaFin letter of 12 August 2013.

I would like to point out again in this context that Dr. Leithner - together with Mr. Lewis - is
responsible for the incorrect information provided by DB to BaFin in DB's letter to BaFin of
23 August 2013 (cf. in this regard TB 11, margin nosmargin nos. 194 -
201). in this letter, Dr. Leithner stated that Mr. Bittar had not been involved in ISDAFIX. He
Is also responsible for the insuf?cient Internal Investigation of DB on ISDAFIX underlying this
incorrect information (as regards the other IBOR submission processes, see below in 

Furthermore, Mr. Walker, too, bears responsibility for the ISDAFIX investigation - which, so
far, is incomplete and delayed in time - which ultimately was not launched until July 2012
following a request by FSA (TB 1, margin no. 166; TB margin no. 910).

The submissions for EURIBOR ISDAFIX and EUR LIBOR ISDAFIX with a term of one
year were made by GFFX, and all other ISDAFIX submissions were made by divisions within
Global Rates. Global Head of GFFX was Mr. Cloete, Head of Global Rates was Mr. Faissoia.
Mr. Cioete and Mr. Faissoia reported to Mr. Jain, who, until his appointment to the
Management Board as of 1 April 2009, in his capacity as Global Head of Global Markets
reported to Dr. Ackermann.

EY states that, in 2010 or at an unknown earlier point in time (TB II, margin no. 716), the
trader Yang Hai at the New York Swaps Desk, according to his own statement, changed the
value of a U50 ISDAFIX submission to improve the position of a DB option trader with a client
(Pimco) (TB II, margin no. 716). This constitutes attempted manipulation. When Pimco
complained, the incident was immediately revealed. The superior of Mr. Hai, Chuck Fletcher,
and the latter's superior, Mr. Thomas Hartnett, were informed (TB 11, margin no. 755).
Apparently on the day when the issue became known, Mr. Fletcher issued an oral warning to
Mr. Hai. There is no written documentation on this conversation. Mr. Fletcher told EY that, at
the time, there had been no formal policy on how to sanction such conduct, and that,
therefore, information on this incident had not been forwarded to units or divisions outside
Global Rates North America (Head of Global Rates North America as of May 2010:
Thomas Hartnett) (TB margin nos. 722; 730 et seq.) It was not until 2014 that the bonus
of Mr. Hai for 2013 was cut (TB II, margin nos. 722; 732); Mr. Hal, however, stated to EY
that he had not been aware that the 2013 bonus cut in 2014 had been the consequence of his
attempted manipulation in 2010 (TB 11, margin no. 920).

Mr. Hai's attempted manipulation had no consequences such as process adaptations or
disciplinary measures. It was not until 2013 that such measures were taken (TB II, margin

no. 909).

EY found that, on 2 December 2011, In the course of the IBOR investigation, a conspicuous
French communication relating to ISDAFIX better Mr. Bitter and Mr. Moryoussef dated
23 November 2009 had been identified at DB (TB margin nos. 75?, 910).

This means that although DB had already had indications of possible misconduct of traders in
connection with ISDAFIX in 2010 and 2011, you reacted to such indications with a time delay
and only upon receipt of corresponding inquiries from regulators (TB H, margin no, 911).

EY further concludes that your bank-internal investigations launched upon receipt of inquiries
from regulators were super?cial and had methodological errors (TB 11, margin no. 917). Your
investigations were focused on answering inquiries from regulators and did not aim at
conducting a comprehensive investigation on manipulations (TB II, margin no. 921).
Overall, EY considers your investigations as reactive and incomplete (TB II, margin no. 923).

b) IBOR submission processes

You also failed to take suf?cient measures to ensure a proper functioning of other 1309.
submission processes as regards both timing and quality of the measures. The fact that,
despite all issues and incidents that had happened before, you did not Implement any such
measures at least until mid-2014 is particularly serious In my view (TB 11, margin no. 1131).
For example, the repon: of DB Group Audit of 31 March 2014 on the benchmark submission
oversight review containing inter alia one "critical issue", three "significant issues" and three
"Important issues? still reports strikingly serious findings. In this matter, particularly Mr. Jain,
as the person responsible for this area, should have been aware of the key importance of
proper submission processes under legal and reputational as well as financial aspects. As in
the ISDAFIX matter, the fact that Mr. Jain and the other senior managers responsible for
at DB obviously did not draw any conclusions from the previous events, in particular
from the outcome and the analysis of the investigations on reference rates conducted so far,
for themselves and for their respective areas of responsibility, even though it was clear
that this would have been necessary, is also to be considered as particularly serious. There is
especially no indication that Mr. Jain and Mr. Cioete obtained confirmations from all
responsible persons or units to the effect that all necessary measures had been taken to
establish proper IBOR submission processes.

In this context, the audit report therefore comes to the conclusion that, to date, a proper
functioning of the submission processes cannot be confirmed (TB II, margin no. 1137). Also,
the fact that disciplinary measures were either not taken at all, or not in a timely manner or
not in a consistent manner constitutes another omission (TB ii, margin nos. 1141 et seq.).

According to Mr. Simon Dodds, DB did not take any steps regarding the special LIBOR
submission process until 2011 despite already existing EBA requirements (TB II, margin no.
938). Such steps were not implemented until mid-2011. The responsibility for this delayed
reaction lies with Mr. Jain and Mr. Cioete (TB 11, margin nos. 946 et seq.).

The conclusion that the bank reacted far too late to the events Is also confirmed by other
prominent positions at DB (cf. TB II, margin nos. 951, 973, 978 regarding interviews with
Mr. Ritchotte, Dr. Leithner and Mr. Huque).

7) Attestations of completeness and other declarations and statements made to
regulators

In individual cases, representatives of DB often did not answer fully or correctly to inquiries
and document requests by various regulators due to insuf?ciencies at organizational level (TB
II, margin nos. 629, 635).

While EY, referring inter alla to its ?rst IBOR special audit completed in 2013 and to the audit
of the annual financial statements and the consolidated ?nancial statements by KPMG in 2008
and 2012, concludes on the one hand that the processes relating to the issue of attestations
of completeness implemented at DB with re5pect to formal audits appear to be appropriate
and suitable (TB 11, margln no. 628), on the other hand, the auditors describe some cases
which considerably tarnish this impression. Examples are a subpoena relating to LIBOR sent
in 2010 by SEC and two requests by FSA and BaFin in 2013 in the same matter, to which you
replied incompletely and in part even incorrectly (TB II, margin nos. 631 et seqq.). This is
totally unacceptable. All members of senior management must be aware that signing
incorrect or incomplete information - in particular, in combination with an attestation of
completeness certainly may have relevant legal consequences and, in particular gives cause
to question their reliability. It must have been clear to all the parties involved that in view of
the importance of the statements and declarations to be con?rmed, an attestation of
completeness requires even more comprehensive and thorough processes.

The requests mentioned above were processed with the material involvement of the legal
department for which, at Management Board level, Mr. Banziger was responsible until the end
of May 2012 and, thereafter, Dr. Leithner (TB 11, margin no. 630). However, it must be noted
that, according to the signatures, Dr.LeIthner and Mr. Lewis were at least responsible for the
letter to BaFin of 23 August 2013 in which they inter alia incorrectly stated that Mr. Bittar had
not been involved in (TB II, margin nos. 619, 626).

Senior Management Review

With regard to the roles as well as responsibilities of the individual persons in senior
management the following conclusions can be recorded already at this point based on the
Senior Management Review prepared during the most recent audit by EY, which does not yet
include the ?ndings from the previous audits in the matter involving IBOR as well as other
audits concerning the involved business areas. I concentrate on the main resulis with regard
to the persons who have both departmental as well as overall responsibility.

Trading Division
Anshu Jain

Mr. Jain had the function as Global Head of Global Markets up to and including March 2009
and was a member of the he was subsequently responsible from 1 April 2009 to 2012
for the area of Global Markets as a member of the Management Board. He was accordineg
also responsible in these functions for the GFFX division and, thus, directly responsible for the
division which was responsible at DB for submissions and in which the traders that have
been identi?ed with regard to misconduct worked.

Mr. .?laln became the co-chalrman of the Management Board as of 1 June 2012 and is also
responsible in this function for, amongst other areas, the ?elds of ?885 which includes the
Global Market division.

Due to the large number of charges involving Mr. Jain as well as due to the substantial
importance of the issue involving "reference interest rates", I consider the failures with which

Mr. Jain is charged to be serious. They display improper management and organization of the
business.

a) Organizational environment of the GFFX division

Mr. Jain must be charged with-the fact that there was an organization and business
environment in the GFFX division, for which he was responsible as the
Global Head of Global Markets until 31 March 2009 and subsequently as the member of the
Management Board with the responsibility for C386, which favored behaviour involving the
exploitation of con?icts of interests and that he ignored organizational duties under
Sec. 25a KWG in conjunction with MaRisk as well as other provisions in the law, also including
incorrect submissions.

aa) Mr. Jain created an environment by the physical and functional restructuring of the
business GFFX division in the year 2005, involving also a change in the seating order of the
?trading l'loor'I in London which he initiated and which was implemented by Mr. Cloete, in
which con?icts of interest between traders and submitters arose or were strengthened (TB 1,
margin nos. 113; 973; also 874 et seq.). Traders and submitters could communicate openly
with each other in this environment that had been created, and the consequence was that
traders and submitters noti?ed each other about their requests for LIBOR and EURIBOR
submissions. These functions were also not (any longer) separated by ?Chinese walls? (TB I,
margin no. 87'5).

bb) Mr. Jain, as the superior of Mr. Cloete and Mr. Nicholls In the organization, was also
responsible for Mr. Cloete and Mr. Nicholls having issued specific directives which promoted
arrangements and inappropriate conduct while ignoring conflicts of interest and compliance
requirements I, margin nos. 868 et seq.).

cc) Mr. Jain is also responsible for the fact that the bonus-driven compensation system
awakened a FELL-driven interest on the part of traders in certain developments of interest
rates or strengthened such interest and the fact that the trading strategy established by
management additionally promoted this Interest TB I, margin nos. 116; 1250 et seq.).

b) Unbalanced business culture

Mr. Jain has organizational re5ponsibility within DB (until 31 March 2009 as the Global Head of
Global Markets, subsequently as responsible member of the Management Board for the area
C8815) for the fact that the GFFX division was characterized by a business culture which
placed the main emphasis on an orientation towards results and maximization of profits,
without making sure that there were appropriate risk monitoring mechanisms. Mr. Jain was
informed at all times about the development of the business and the risk situation in the GFFX
division and had regular contact with the MRM in the case of exceeding limits (TB I, margin
no. 114). Furthermore, Mr. Jain also supported high risk positions in the DFFX division, at
times contrary to the requirement of the MRM for a reduction of risks. The conclusion must
be drawn from this that Mr. Jain prioritized maximization of pro?ts compared to the
requirements of the monitoring units and assuring his responsibility for monitoring (TB i,
margin no. 115).

Furthermore, Mr. Jain did not place sufficient value on compliance by the employees in the
GFFX division. The focus in the GFFX division (later: FIC) was obviously on the business
figures and not on compliance by employees. E.g. completion of mandatory training in the

GFFX division was not effectively enforced, although Mr. Jain knew that this was not being
given the intended attention (TB 1, margin no. 1164).

The fact that there was a need to act with regard to the culture in the trading division is also
apparent from the telephone call in June 2008 between Mr. Jain and Dr. Ackermann.
Dr. Ackermann- expressed in this telephone call his anger about '"cultural de?cits" in Global
Markets divisions which he said he would no longer tolerate because this unnecessarily
endangered the reputation of the bank (TB 1, margin nos. 126; 1156), which reinforces the
?ndings of EY and the present charges derived from those findings. This demand by the
chairman of the Management Board at that time and at the same time the person who was
responsible for the division should have been an immediate reason for Mr. Jain to examine
and change the business cultureobviously took a defensive position
in order to justify the existing operations of business up to that time.

According to an investigation by Oliver Wyman in 200?, there were methodological
weaknesses in measuring risk and deficlm in monitoring risk. Deutsche Bundesbank (German
Federal Bank) identified a number of organizational and structural deficits in 2009, including
with regard to processes for monitoring market price risk, and McKinsey also raised objections
in 2009 to the fact that eSpecially successful business divisions were not adequately
monitored. The processes and responsibilities in connection with risk management were
possibly not treated with the requisite respect or carried out with the necessary dedication.
Furthermore, the McKinsey report provides indications that risks were often underestimated in
the business divisions (TB 1, margin no. 923). Mr. Jain is also responsible for this as the
Global Head of Global Markets (until 31 March 2009) and as a member of the Management
Board with responsibility for the C885 (starting on 1 April 2009).

c) Bank-internal Investigations of IBOR submissions

Mr. Jain did not ensure the initiation of a comprehensive Internal investigation of the 180R
submissions at the bank either in 2008, when he learned about rumors and discussions in the
market concerning the susceptibility of LIBOR for manipulation TB I, margin nos. 106-
109; 511 et seqq.), or in the year 2009 after the MMD desk and eSpeclally the trader
Christian Bittar had generated unusually high trading results in 2008. Each of these aspects
by itself, and in any event when viewed together, show that Mr. Jain should have arranged for
such a comprehensive internal investigation at the bank already in 2008, but at the latest in
2009. In detail:

Mr. Jain has been proven to have learned about discussion in the market concerning the
susceptibility of the LIBOR to manipulation in 2008 T8 I, margin no. 109). However, he
did not draw any consequences for DB (in the form of investigations) as a result of these
indications in the market (TB I, margin no. 112). The explanation provided by Mr. Jain to EY
for his lack of activity, according to which there was no motive for due to liquidity
position of D8 at that time TB 1, margin no. 112), is not convincing. In addition to the
motive for "lowballing', which involves representing the liquidity position of the bank in a
more positive light, there was a further potential motive for incorrect IBOR submissions
consisting of the maximization of pro?ts and, thus, bonuses on the part of traders. This
aspect which has also correctly been emphasized by some foreign public authorities (cf. e.g.
Attachment A to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement of the 00] dated 23 April 2015, margin
no. 18) must also have been known to Mr. Jain.

At the beginning of 2009, Mr. Jain also had knowledge about the high trading results of the
MMD Desk and especially of the trader Bittar as well as of his high bonus entitlement which
was predominantly based on the development of the IBOR rates. Mr. Jain also intensively
supported this claim of Mr. Bittar for a bonus in a remarkable manner in January 2009 in a
telephone call to Dr. Ackermann by referring to both Mr. Bitter as well as Mr. Maine as 
good guys, they are the best people on the street" as well as the best guys we have got".
The telephone call proves that Mr. Jain not only knew Mr. Bittar but had also promoted and
supported him. Mr. Jain also knew the trading strategy and the trading results of the MMD
Desk and the trader Blttar who was behind these results at the latest from 30 August 2007.

Both the IBOR discussion in the year 2008 as well as the knowledge in 2009 about the high
trading results for 2008 should have caused the initiation of internal investigations at the
bank concerning the involvement of DB traders in 180R manipulations; in any event,
however, this results when viewing both a5pects together.

d) Suspicion of making an incorrect statement to the Deutsche Bundesbank

There is suspicion that Mr. Jain might have knowingly made incorrect statements in his IBOR
related Interview with the Deutsche Bundesbank on 5 October 2012. Mr Jain stated in this
interview that he started having doubts about the fixing of the LIBOR for the first time in the
first quarter of 2011 and that, in 2008, he had no knowledge about the LIBDR discussions in
the market or about the meeting with the BBA in 2008 and the internal discussion at the bank
on this issue TB I, margin no. 110 and the Bundesbank Report dated 9 November 2012
on Senior Management, margin no. 38 and margin no. 13). However, EY determined that
Mr. Jain must have known about the LIBOR discussion in the market and the meeting at the
BBA due to e-mails which had been forwarded to him T8 I, margin no. 109). Mr. Jain
tried to explain his incorrect statement to the Bundesbank to EY by the fact that he was only
able to remember in detail the time after August 2008 (TB 1, margin no. 111). However, this
does not explain why Mr. Jain did not refer to his lack of memory already in this interview
with the Bundesbank and Instead made incorrect statements at the time. Therefore, as has
already been mentioned, there is suspicion that Mr. Jain could have knowingly made incorrect
statements to the Deutsche Bundesbank.

e) Implementation of proper submission processes

Mr. Jain must face the reprimand that he failed in 2009 to make sure that 180R control
processes were implemented and that the measures which were ?nally taken in 2011 were
inadequate. When Mr. Jain became a member of the Management Board as of 1 April 2009
(responsible for C885), he not only procured that proper submission process and controls
were implemented (submission process and controls were introduced for the ?rst time in
2011, albeit inadequately). EY determined that Mr. Jain would have been required to take
these measures as Head of Global Markets and, as of 1 April 2009, as member of the
Management Board responsible for C885, at the latest starting in 2009 according to the BBA
requirements for implementation of control procedures regarding IBOR submissions (TB 1,
margin no. 132). EY also found that the measures taken in 2011 were insuf?cient (TB 1,
margin 134.).

f) BIRG review

aa) Insuf?cient investigation mandate

Mr. Jain also faces the allegation that he did not make sure that there was a speci?c search
also for potential acts of manipulation of the IBOR by DB traders in the course of the BIRG
review.

The investigations initiated in the year 2009 (Broeksmit; BIRG) were insuf?cient. The scope
of the Broeksmit investigation initiated with regard to the high bonus entitlement of Mr. 'Bittar
was limited to examining whether the profits of the MMD Desk were real and had not been
caused by false valuations or internal transactions. The BIRG MMD investigation instructed by
Mr. Ritchotte, which Mr. Jain approves, was insufficient in that it did not include the possibility
of acts by DB traders to manipulate the 180R. In this context, Mr. Jain failed to ensure that
potential acts of manipulation by DB traders were speci?cally checked out in the course of the
BIRG MMD investigation.

bb) BIRG presentation to the Management Board

The preliminary results of the BIRG investigation were presented to Mr. Jain on
30 November 2009. Mr. Jain was also informed in that context about compliance-relevant
topics. However, Mr. Jain did not respond by demanding that provisions on compliance be
observed at the MMD Desk. To the contrary, the compliance-relevant topics were not the
subject of a presentation of the results to the Management Board on 8 December 2009.
Although Mr. Jain cannot be proven to have exercised in?uence on the BIRG report, EY ?nds
that there is a connection in terms of timing between the presentation to Mr. Jain on
30 November 2009 and the removal of the compliance-relevant topics by the time the
presentation was held to the Management Board on 8 December 2009. BY could not prove
that Mr. Jain had exercised in?uence here TB 1, margin no. 125; TB II, margin 122 et
seq.; 128 et seq.).

9) ISDAFIX

Mr. Jain is responsible at the level of the Management Board that, in 2010 and 2011,
indications of misconduct in connection with the were handled only In a reactive
manner upon receipt of corresponding inquiries from regulators and with substantial delays,
and for the fact that DB failed to completely record and document the ISDAFIX submissions
processes and to designate specific responsible persons TB 1, margin nos. 135 et seq.).

It is to be criticized in particular that Mr. Jain did not draw any or only insuf?cient
consequences from the acts involving manipulation of the by DB traders regarding
ISDAFIX about which he had learned, in any event, in mid-2011. There would have been
reason considering the issues known in connection with IBOR from mid-2011 to obtain
con?rmation that the submissions processes for the ISDAFIX were proper and did not have
defects. This did not occur. As stated above, it was not until 2012/2013 that investigation
measures and efforts to implement controls started, although they finally proved to be
unsuitable to preclude the risk of manipulation.

h) Examination of all submission processes with regard to susceptibility to manipulation

Mr. Jain, who is, together with Mr. Fitschen, responsible for the Group Audit department since
his appointment as Co-chairman of the Management Board and as such was, in 2012,
responsible that no complete, comprehensive and independent audit of all submission
processes with regard to their susceptibility to manipulation and of the potential indications of
specific manipulations within DB still had not occurred at least until October 2014. The
conclusion from this circumstance is that no proper business organization pursuant to

Sec. 25a of the German Banking Act (KWG) had been Implemented at least until that point In
time with regard to the submission processes at DB, either the IBOR Issues should have
necessarily led to a complete and comprehensive investigation of all submission processes
with regard to possibilities for manipulation.

I) Completeness'of the EMARS system

Mr. Jain, as the responsible member of the Management Board for the relevant business
division, must face the allegation that the communications platforms investigated in
connection with the internal IBOR investigation at DB were not examined with regard to their
completeness, which is why not all communications applications were taken into account.

j) No consequences taken

Mr. Jain must also face the allegation that there was basically no proper management with
regards to the submission processes until the audit by EY. It was especially not possible to
verify that Mr. Jain had taken all necessary action to establish proper ISDAFIX and IBOR
processes until April 2014 when DB stopped the submissions or, with regard to IBOR
submissions, until at least the middle of 2014. No consequences have been taken with regard
to personnel aside from the involved traders and a London manager, although there were
major organizational de?cits here which enabled the relevant traders to engage in misconduct
in the first place. This involves not only misconduct of individual traders, but major systemic
de?cits for which nobody has been held responsible so far. Especially in the case of
individuals who work in key positions at DB, such as members of the GEC, an essential aspect
should be the absolute integrity of these individuals.

Alan Cloete

During the period from August 2007 until the end of May 2012, Mr. Cloete was Global Head of
GFFX and, thus, directly responsible for the division which was re5ponsible for transmitting
the reference Interest rates and in which those traders worked who could be proven to have
been engaged in attempts at manipulation. As of 1 June 2012, Mr. Cloete became Co-Chlef
Executive Officer Asia-Pacific and a member of the GEC. Mr. Cloete was and is directly
subordinate to Mr. Jain in both capacities and fell and falls within Mr. Jain's area of
responsibility.

EY expressly points out that in light of the very close and informal communications between
Mr. Nicholls and his direct superior, Mr. Cloete, the possibility cannot be precluded that
Mr. Cloete already knew about possible manipulation by employees of DB even prior to 2011.
Furthermore, EY concludes from the further fact that Mr. Nicholls, according to his own
statement, always kept Mr. Cloete informed about the trading strategy and the risk that was
taken, with this occurring on specific occasions and primarily personally because both men
had their of?ces direct next to each other In London, that knowledge of Mr. Cloete about the
instruction from Mr. Nicholls to Mr. Curtler in October 2007 - "make sure our labors are on
the low side for all ccys." - is even likely and that Mr. Cloete might even have personally
issues this directive TB I, margin no.84). i agree with this assessment.

Even without having final certainty in this respect, the role of Mr. Cloete must be considered
to be problematic due to the above findings. According to the findings of EY, Mr. Cloete is one
of the main persons responsible within the organization of DB for various organizational and
procedural deficits concerning the IBOR submissions and the business environment in which
the problematic submissions and communications arose. This includes especially findings with

regard to the bank?internal monitoring mechanisms and the risk management as well as the
entire business culture. Overall, his failures must be considered to be serious In this regard.

a) Organizational environment in the GFFX division

Mr. Cioete must first face the allegation of the fact that there was an organizational. and
business environment In the division he led which favored incorrect submissions or even made
them possible in the first place. He negligently created a situation which favored the
exploitation of con?icts of interests and overcame monitoring mechanisms. He is accordingly
at least indirectly responsible for incorrect submissions In his division.

as) According to a statement by the trader Skofenko, Mr. Cioete had responsibility together
with Mr. Jain, to whom he reported directly, for the new organizational structure in the GFFX
division which had the consequence that conflicts of interests between traders and submitters
arose or were strengthened (TB 1, margin nos. 878 et seqq.; 973). Existing barriers were
eliminated in this manner, and almost literally the door was Opened for collusion between
traders and submitters.

bb) Mr. Cioete, as the direct superior of Mr. Nicholls, is also responsible for the fact that
Mr. Nicholls issued speci?c directives which promoted collusion and improper conduct while
con?icts of interest and compliance requirements were ignored (T 1, margin nos. 868 et

seq.).

cc) Mr. Cioete is also responsible for the fact that the bonus-driven compensation system
awakened or reinforced an interest on the part of traders In certain developments of Interest
rates and that the trading strategy established by management additionally promoted this
interest TB I, margin nos. 1255 et seqq.: 1262; 1264; 1266).

b) Imbalance in the business culture

Mr. Cioete Is responsible within the bank - without this precluding the responsibilities of other
people at other levels - for the fact that the GFFX division was characterized by a business
culture which placed priority on orientation towards the results and maximising profits without
assuring responsibilities for monitoring and appropriate risk control mechanisms (TB 1, margin
nos. 75; 1164). He regularly ignored the exceeding of limits and indications from the risk
management function concerning high risk positions which were reported to him daily in
addition to the development of the account by referring to Instructions given to him in
telephone conferences. He also permitted Mr. Blttar In the year 2007 to continue his
transactions marked by high risk positions as In the past ("Keep going you going great"; TB 1,
margin nos. 73 et seq.). The responsibilities of the supervisors in the division for which
Mr. Cioete was responsible were not clearly communicated. The confirmations of the
supervisors concerning duties and responsibilities were not issued or were not timely.
Mr. Cioete did not negligently fail to recognize these circumstances, instead he knowingly
ignOred them.

Furthermore, he did not place sufficient importance on the behaviour of his employees in
terms of compliance. He knew, among other aspects, that the completion of mandatory
training sessions in the GFFX division with regard to compliance-related issues was not being
effectively observed (TB 1, margin no. 1164).

Finally, according to an investigation by Oliver Wyman In 2007, there were methodological
weaknesses in the risk assessment and deficits in risk monitoring, and Deutsche Bundesbank

also identi?ed In 2009 a number of organizational and structural de?cits, including with regard
to the processes for monitoring market price risk. McKinsey also objected in 2009 to the fact
that especially successful divisions were not adequately checked out (TB 1, margin no. 923).
Mr. Cioete, as head of the GFFX division, is at least partially responsible also for this under the
aspect of reasonably monitoring risk in the division.

c) Bank-internal investigations about the IBOR submissions

Mr. Cioete failed to carry out investigations about possible manipulation of IBOR starting in
March 2008 (at the time of the BIZ quarterly report) when he ?rst learned about the
susceptibility of the IBOR submissions to manipulation, but at the latest starting in 2009 after
learning about the IBOR discussion in the market and after the exorbitant pro?ts were
generated at the MMD desk within the GFFX division. His knowledge about and support of
Mr. Bitter and his trading strategies also play a role here, just as in the case of Mr. Jain. The
trading pro?ts would have required stronger and more in-depth monitoring than actually
occurred. Furthermore, the discussion about IBOR should have been a reason for Mr. Cioete
to propose or trigger an internal investigation in his division by the bank. In any event, both
developments when viewed together and also the reporting and communications structure in
the GFFX division (cf. above) necessarily resulted in such a need. This follows especially from
the close coordination between Mr. Cioete and the individual trading desks and the
environment which he created which permitted communications outside of the necessary
protections. Anyone who eliminates existing protections for the avoidance of conflicts of
interest must have an ever greater interest in investigating and preventing abusive conduct
and must demonstrate corresponding involvement. Mr. Cioete did not ful?l this re5ponsibility,
although exactly this would have been necessary and expected.

d) Submissions monitoring processes

Mr. Cioete, as the reSponsible head of the GFFX division, failed to develop and implement
submissions monitoring processes (margin nos. 95; 946 et seq.). According to EY, this should
have occurred at the latest starting in 2009. According to EY, the BBA requirements would
have represented a reasonable basis (TB 1, margin no.95). The responsibility for this also lay
with the representatives of DB In the management of GFFX, I.e. Mr Jain and Mr. Cioete (TB II,
margin no. 947)

e) BIRG review

During the course of the BIRG review, Mr. Cioete improperly exercised influence on the results
of the Investigation by the BIRG team as what was actually an Independent control body, or
Mr. Cioete at least tried to do so. He attempted in the context of numerous consultations and
comments on versions to place the ?ndings in the BIRG MMD report about the business for
which he was responsible in a better light (TB 1, margin nos. 78; 184). Although the changes
were mitigated by the BIRG team, his exercise of in?uence is characterized in the course of
your Initial investigation as ?making the situation appear better" (TB 1, margin no. 81). The
changes and requests for changes by Mr. Cioete are referred to by EY as "noticeable"

(auffailig).

This leads to the conclusion that Mr. Cioete had no interest in an unrestrained investigation of
possible Improper situations or incorrect developments, weaknesses or de?cits in his division
which had to be corrected. He was obviously instead interested in defending and maintaining
his business and management model that existed up to that time, which did not attach great
importance on topics such as business culture or compliance.

f) Stubbornly maintaining the status quo of the LIBOR submission process

Mr. Cloete must be charged with the fact that he took the position within DB in the year 2008
in accordance with the predominant view of exercising influence on the BSA in such a manner
that the existing submission processes would be changed as little as possible (TB 1, margin
nos. 86; 795). He must face the allegation in this respect that he indirectly participated in -
allowing the susceptibility of IBDR to continue to exist.

9) Completeness of the EMARS system

Mr. Cloete must also face the allegation that the communications platforms Investigated in the
course of your internal IBDR investigation were not checked with regard to completeness,
which is why not all communications applications were taken Into account.

h) Sets of facts rising strong suspicions
aa) Knowledge of manipulation prior to 2011

EY raises the suspicion In its discussion that Mr. Cloete had learned even prior to 2011 about
potential manipulation by employees of DB in light of the very close and informal
communication between Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Cloete (TB margin nos. 84; 99). Mr. Nicholls
always kept Mr. Cloete informed about both the trading strategy and the risk that was taken.
Mr. Nicholls spoke as the occasion needed and primarily personally with Mr. Cloete because
both had their offices in London directly next to each other (TB II, margin nos. 84). It is very
difficult to conceive in light of this that Mr. NIcholIs would have issued a directive having the
scope expressed In his e-rnall In October 2007 (?make sure out Iibors are on the low side for
all ccys.") without prior consultation with Mr. Cloete or even a directive from him.

Since such a presumption can only be rebutted with great dif?culty due to the objective
and despite the disputation by Mr. Cloete, the question arises about the effects on the
position of Mr. Cloete.

bb) Discussion with Mr. Blttar about termination

As has been discussed above, the statement by Mr. Bittar in a letter from his attorney, which
Mr. Cloete has disputed and according to which Mr. Cloete informed Mr. Bitter in the context
of the discussions about termination that he (Mr. Bitter) had done nothing wrong and had
only become the victim of internal and external politics, are further indications that Mr. Cloete
could have known and approved of Mr. Blttar?s acts of manipulation. However, it must be also
taken into account in my view that Mr. Bittar ls pursuing personal ?nancial interests so that
his statements must be evaluated under this aspect. However, the described statement of
fact by Mr. Bitter must be considered to be a further element of suspicion against Mr. Cloete.

cc) Frankfurt traders

As discussed above, three of the four Frankfurt traders, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Gharagozlou and
Mr. Kappauf, stated In the course of their complains seeking protection against termination
that Mr. Cloete had stated In a video conference on 2 February 2012 that no further dust
should be raised, particularly in light of the then pending appointment of Mr. Jaln as the co-
CEO of DB. Mr. Cloete is stated to have literally said: will close this box.?; don't want
any noises. Anshu is becoming TB I, margin no. 882). Mr. Cloete was stated to
have ordered a reduction of bonuses as a ?nal punishment of the Improper

communications/acts of manipulations and expressed that he also bore his share of
responsibility when he said, "We all need to bear our share.? (TB I, margin nos. 883 et seq).

Although Mr. Cloete disputes that he made these statements or he says that he does not have
any recollection, the statements of the three traders would have to be considered correct and
indications of the fact that Mr. Cloete had no interest In investigating the events or severely
sanctioning the traders and instead wanted to get rid of the matter as quietly as possible and
that he was aware of his part of the responsibility. An element of suspicion also ?nally
remains against Mr. Cloete in light of this aspect.

dd} Incorrect response to FSA inquiry - statements of Mr. Simon Jackson

An inquiry from the British supervisory authority FSA In March 2011 was answered in a
questionable manner and on a basis which cannot be verified in connection with the false BBA
confirmation in the year 2010. The answering ietter was supposedly submitted to Mr. Cloete
and approved by him, although he disputes this, according to an e-mall from
Mr. Simon Jackson in the year 2011 and according to a written statement made to EY (TB Ii,
margin nos. 347 et seq. and margin nos. 939 et seqq.). However, EY correctly raises doubts
about the evidentlary value of the statement by Mr. Jackson because he demonstrany signed
the false BBA confirmation in January 2011. Thus, the possibility cannot be precluded that he
did not state the truth here either (TB II, margin nos. 351 et seq.). However, this is also
another statement which burdens Mr. Cloete.

ee) Statements of Mr. Cloete regarding BIRG

Mr. Cioete's statements about the exercise of influence on the BIRG review also raises doubts
about his integrity. He is quoted with making the statement that he did not have the
authority to in?uence the report due to the Independence of the BIRG report. However, in
fact, 22 different drafts were forwarded to him for comments, and his changes had the nature
of placing the situation in a better Even if Mr. Cloete still disputes that he exercised
in?uence, EY concludes that his statements on this point are "not very plausible" (TB 1,
margin no. 187). i agree with this.

ff) Conclusion

In the aggregate, there remain substantial elements of suspicion with regard to the
involvement of Mr. Cloete. There are numerous indications that Mr. Cloete already knew
about possible manipulative actions with DB with regard to IBOR prior to 2011. It appears
likely to EY that Mr. Cloete also knew or even himself gave the instructions to issue the
directive from Mr. Nicholls to Mr. Curtler ("make sure our libors are on the low side for all
Even if this were not the case, Mr. Cloete would at least be indirectly responsible for
the organizational parameters that favoured the misuse of 18012 submissions.

Michele Faissola

Mr. Faissola was Global Head of Rates and/or Head of Global Rates until 31 May 2012. In this
position, Mr. Falssola was directly subordinated to Mr. Jain and was placed within the iatter's
area of reaponsibility. Mr. Falssola was appointed Head of Asset Wealth Management and
became a member of the GEC on 1 June 2012.

EY draws particular attention to the fact that, in light of the analysis of the trader
ShivaniMathur, it cannot be excluded that Mr. Faissola had become aware of possible
manipulations by employees of DB already before 2011.

The misconduct for which Mr. Faissola is accountable, which relates primarily to the omission
of Investigation measures and the failure to remedy procedural de?ciencies, must be classi?ed
as serious. This applies even more because Mr. Faissola (besides Mr. Cloete) is one of the
sole two members of DB's senior management for whom EY cannot exclude that they had
been aware already before mid-2011 of internal IBOR manipulations within the bank.

a) Omission of investigation measures concerning the submission processes

Mr. Faissola must face the allegation that he failed, despite his senior position within the
trading division, to initiate extensive investigation measures concerning DB's submission
processes already in 2008 at the latest, although he had received a ?rst indication in
August 2007 and several clear indications as of 2008 pointing at de?ciencies within the 
submission process and although, according to EY's findings of 2008, he was the person,
besides Mr. Cloete, who dealt the most with the 180R issue as compared with the other senior
management members. EY would have expected, for example, that Mr. Faissola examined
the causes for DB's low EURIBOR submissions mentioned by Ms. Mathur in her analysis In
early November 2008, in particular because, according to EY's assessment Mr. Faissola had
already become aware of possible IBOR manipulations by DB employees by way of this
analysis.

b) No examination of the high trading income at an early stage

Furthermore, Mr. Faissola must face the allegation that he also failed to question the 
desk's high trading income by 2008 at the latest, considering the aforementioned fact that he
had been aware of and dealt with possible IBOR manipulations in the market and within 08,
in particular as he was also regularly informed of the high risks In GFFX because he was a
participant of the so-called "risk calls? in 2007/2008 and as he had also been aware of that
division's business strategy as of November 2008 at the latest.

c) Stubbornly maintaining the status quo of the LIBOR submission process

Additionally, Mr. Faissola must face the allegation that he took the position, in accordance
with the predominant view within DB in 2008, that in?uence should be exercised on the 88A
in such a manner that the existing submission process would be changed as little as possible.
In this context, he must face the allegation that he indirectly participated in allowing the
susceptibility to manipulation of 180R submissions to continue to exist.

d) Inadequacy of the ISDAFIX submission processes

Furthermore, It must be noted that Mr. Faissola, in his function as Head of Global Rates, was
responsible for the adequacy of a major part of the 15mm submission processes until the
end of May 2012, which he was unable, however, to ensure fully. For example, the Global
Rates division under his lead omitted to fully record and document the ISDAFIX submission
processes and to de?ne speci?c responsibilities and Implement adequate controls. Moreover,
there was no process In place that could have informed Mr. Faissola Immediately in 2010 of
possible USD ISDAFIX manipulations by his staff member Yang Hal. In general, Indications of
possible ISDAFIX manipulations did not result in any consequences being drawn in the form of
process adjustments or changed responsibilities. Disciplinary or procedural consequences

were not actually drawn until mid-2013, however only after Mr. Faissola had already been
appointed Head of Asset Wealth Management and had become a member of the GEC.

e) Suspicious facts as a result of allegations by the trader Ms. Mathur

At least some suspicious facts remain with a view to the allegations raised by Ms. Mathur
against Mr. Faissola that he had asked her in 2008 to communicate her trading positions to
the trading colleagues responsible for IBOR submissions within the Cash Desk in Frankfurt
such that the corresponding positions could also be taken into account within the framework
of submissions. This is because an internal analysis performed by Ms. Mathur at the
time around the rumors about LIBOR's susceptibility to manipulation drew Mr. Faissola's
attention to the fact that DB had submitted EURIBORs signi?cantly below the corresponding
average rates.

Consequently, I hold the opinion that there are at least indications also with regard to
Mr. Faissola that he could have been aware as early as in 2008 of incorrect submissions made
by DB.

Dr. Josef Ackerrnann

As chairman of the Management Board, Dr. Ackermann was responsible, among other things,
for the group's Corporate Investment Banking (CIB) division as of ljanuary 2007 until
31 March 2009, the date when his responsibilities changed. As a consequence, he was also
the head of the GFFX division at that time. Furthermore, he was responsible at Management
Board level for the Group Audit function during the time from 1 January 2011 until he left DB
on 31 May 2012.

The misconduct for which Dr. Ackermann is accountable relates mostly to omitting
investigation measures in the IBOR matter and must therefore be considered to be quite
important. However, it must be acknowledged that Dr. Ackermann initiated discussions on
the "internal culture" already at an early stage, at least in 2008.

a) Organizational responsibility

Dr. Ackermann, as the Management Board member who was responsible for the GFFX
division, among other things, until March 2009, must face the allegation that he obviously
failed to look into this division suf?ciently to realize that there existed serious structural and
procedural deficits. These deficits, in combination with insufficient control processes, made it
possible for traders to collude in the context of 180R submissions.

b) Omission of Improvement measures concerning the submission processes

Dr. Ackermann must further face the allegation that, in his function as Management Board
member responsible for the Group Audit function, he failed to immediately order
comprehensive Investigation measures concerning DB's internal 180R submission processes
after he had become aware of possible IBOR manipulations by a trader of DB in a meeting of
the Management Board at the end of June 2011. According to EY's ?ndings, he Instead for
the first time ordered comprehensive information on the then already ongoing internal IBOR
investigations only in February 2012, an approach that EY puts in the temporal context of
DB's annual general meeting in May 2012.

c) Incomplete recording of submission processes

Finally, it must be noted that Dr. Ackermann, as the Management Board member responsible
for Group Audit, did not initiate? a comprehensive independent review of all submission
processes regarding their susceptibility to manipulation and possible indications of specific
manipulations within DB, which is the reason, according to EY's assessment, why there was
no properly functioning business organization of Group Audit pursuant to Sec. 25a (1) KWG
With regard 'to the submission processes at that time, either.? 

Group Audit, Compliance and Legal
Dr. Stephen Leithner

Dr. Leithner was Co-Head of Coverage until June 2012, in which function he was not a
member of senior management. On 1 June 2012, Dr. Leithner was appointed Chief Executive
Officer Europe (excluding Germany and the UK), thus becoming a member of the
Management Board, and was also responsible for HR, Legal and Compliance as well as
Government Regulatory Affairs. Until his appointment as a Management Board member,
Dr. Leithner had not dealt with the issue of IBOR reference rates; he was involved In
analysing and drawing consequences from the 1809. events since the time of his appointment
to the Management Board.

As Dr. Leithner joined the Management Board only as of 1 June2012 and had not been
involved in the events surrounding IBOR before that date, he was not responsible for the
manipulations by traders of DB and thus also cannot be held accountable in this respect.
Dr. Leithner must face allegations in connection with the analysis of, and the consequences
drawn from, the events, which are, however, less serious than the allegations related to the
facilitation of manipulation attempts.

a) Incomplete business organization

As the Management Board member responsible for Compliance as of 1 June 2012,
Dr. Leithner must face the allegation that there was no complete and properly functioning
business organization pursuant to Sec. 25a (1) KWG In place for the control of the submission
processes for the time from IJune 2012; Group Audit made at least significant ?ndings
during several audits of material measures, such as the so-called Compliance Monitoring
Program for LIBOR, EURIBOR and TIBOR.

b) Deficits of DB's internal IBOR investigation

As the Management Board member responsible for Legal as of 1 June 2012, Dr. Leithner has
been responsible for DB's internal IBOR investigation as of this date. In this context, he is
accountable for the deficits of this internal investigation of DB, which have been established
by EY in their ?rst audit report of 22 March 2013. I refer to my statements relating to EY's
first audit report of 12 August 2013 in this respect.

c) Suspicion that statements made to EY were not fully true

There is the suspicion that Dr. Leithner's statements made in his interview with EY were not
fully true. Dr. Leithner pointed out to Mr. Michael Golden in an e-mail of February 2013,
which he forwarded to Mr. Jain, that the LIBOR discussions of 2008 and, in particular, the
recommendations of the Fed from 2008 should not be mentioned to the press, because
otherwise the question could be asked why no one had reacted at that time (TB I, margin
nos. 187; 687-691; 766). This illustrates that the LIBOR discussion that occurred in the

market in 2008 and the Fed's recommendations could in fact have been, and would have had
to be, a cause for reaction by DB. Dr. Leithner was not able to recall his e-mail of
February 2013 in either interview with EY, which is "suspicious" according to EY (TB 1, margin
no. 188). I hold the view that the suspicion of having made an untrue statement has not
been dispelled.

d) Incomplete attestation of completeness

Dr. Leithner, as the Management Board member responsible for Legal since 1 June 2012,
must face the allegation that he issued an incorrect attestation of completeness signed by him
regarding the analyzed communication data to EY on 22 March 2013. It had turned out later
on that the Reuters Dealing 3000 platform had not been checked within the scope of DB's
internal investigation. However, EY concludes that DB basically acted with due care when it
issued the attestation of completeness and followed a prior process when issuing It. The
allegation raised against Dr. Leithner is not serious in this regard.

e) Incorrect statement to BaFin and insufficient clarification of the facts in the 
matter

Dr. Leithner must face the allegation that - although not deliberately - he made an incorrect
written statement to BaFin in August 2013. Dr. Leithner signed a letter of 23 August 2013,
which was addressed to me, in which he wrongly stated in response to my request regarding
that there was no connection between Mr. Blttar and ISDAFIX.

Additionally, Dr. Leithner must face the allegation that he is also responsible for the
insufficient clarification of the facts surrounding Mr. Bitter and ISDAFIX, which led to the
incorrect statement made to BaFin. In July 2012, the FSA had asked for clari?cation of
communication, which concerned ISDAFIX, between Mr. Bittar and a third person
(Mr. Moryoussef). As a result, DB carried out an investigation into ISDAFIX and conducted an
interview with Mr. Bitter in this context, but without presenting the relevant communication to
him. According to EY's finding, the investigation related to carried out by DB was
insofar-incomplete and also only reactive, for which Dr. Leithner as the individual with
departmental responsibility is responsible.

Richard Walker

As general counsel for the entire bank, a position he had already been holding since 2005,
Mr. Walker was appointed to the GEC on 1 June 2012. As general counsel, Mr. Walker was
and is directly subordinated to the respective Management Board member responsible for
Legal, which was Dr. Leithner during the period from 1 June 2012 until the end of 2014.

The following allegations, if considered In aggregate, must already be deemed quite
significant because the underlying ?ndings had a direct effect on how DB dealt with the IBOR

Issue.
a) Failure to address and communicate IBOR issues sufficiently

Mr. Walker must face the allegation that he addressed the IBOR issue only insufficiently from
an organizational perspective, despite correSponding indications, and that he communicated
relevant information from Legal, the business division headed by him, relating to the
submissions only insuf?ciently to you.

According to EY, despite receiving an increasing number of inquiries from regulators during
2010, Mr. Walker for example failed to pay suf?cient attention to the requests for information
submitted connection with submissions. Furthermore, EY did
not notice any stronger involvement after a subpoena of the SEC of 4 August 2010 regarding
USD LIBOR submissions of DB and Is right to take a critical view in this respect (TB 1, margin
no. 827). At least the legal nature of a subpoena should have caused Mr. Walker in his
capacity as general counsel to deal with the issues addressed therein.

Moreover, Mr. Walker became aware on 29 March 2011 of Mr. Nicholls' manipulative e-mail
communication that had been discovered several weeks earlier. EY did not ?nd any
indications that Mr. Walker directly informed the Management Board thereof on his part. EY
comes to the correct conclusion that this would have to be expected considering the
imaginable explosiveness of the information (TB 1, margin nos. 156 et seq.; 829 et seq.),
because it was a clear sign of IBOR manipulations within the bank. The e-mail
communication also was not mentioned in the following meeting of the Management Board on
19 April 2011, during which the investigations conducted by the US authorities SEC, CFTC and
001 against panel banks in connection with alleged manipulations were addressed.

Consequently, Mr. Walker must face the allegation that he has his share of responsibility for
the fact that you, as members of the Management Board, did not address the IBOR issue
earlier. A risk-adequate handling of the subject would have required to draw your, i.e. the
Management Board's attention to legal and reputationai risks that could arise for your bank,
too, at an early stage. It appears to me that this is a manifestation of part of the culture that
Is possibly still characteristic to your bank, l.e. to prefer hiding, covering up or entirely
negating problems instead of addressing them openly and actively In order to prevent similar
issues in the future.

b) Incorrect statement made to the supervisors

Mr. Walker is responsible for the fact that the communication applications analysed by
DB Legal In connection with the internal investigation carried out at DB were not reviewed for
completeness. As a result, not all of the applications were taken into account, for example
the RD 3000 platform (TB 1, margin no. 159). As a consequence, he signed an attestation of
completeness to be issued to EY in March 2013 that was factually inaccurate in this regard
(TB 1, margin nos. 160 et seq.). When he issued the attestation to EY in its function as service
provider and administrative assistant to the supervisors, he thus ultimately made the
incorrect statement also to me. For this attestation, he did not assume re5ponsibllity - as can
occasionally be observed in companies - merely by his signature and without any closer
relation to the attested issue. Rather, DB Legal and thus Mr. Walker as divisional head had
been functionally competent for the internal investigation and therefore also for the
completeness of the date to be analyzed. The division could have fulfilled this responsibility
by obtaining a confirmation from the technical department, GT 0 (TB, margin nos. 159; 163).

Furthermore, Mr. Walker was involved in another incorrect statement issued to BaFin, when
you (DB) based your reply to my letter of August 2013 on the incorrect statements made by
Mr. Bitter regarding his involvement in ISDAFIX submissions. Mr. Walker bore overall
responsibility for the investigation (TB I, margin no. 164), but - incomprehensibiy - did not
obtain any third party checks whether Mr. Bittar indeed had not had any connection to
ISDAFIX submissions, which could actually have been expected in view of his position.

c) ISDAFIX investigation

Finally, Mr. Walker is responsible for the fact that the ISDAFIX Investigation has so far been
carried out incompletely and with a delay (TB 1, margin no. 166). in my opinion, however,
there should have been a comprehensive investigation of all ISDAFIX submission processes
well before July 2012, which is why Mr. Walker also bears a share of responsibility for the fact
that a proper business organization pursuant to Sec.25a KWG did not exist in this area.

Stefan Krause

Mr. Krause has been a member of your Management Board since April 2003 and Chief
Financial Officer since 1 October 2008. Moreover, between 1 April 2009 and
31 December 2010, Mr. Krause had departmental responsibility for Group Audit.

Mr. Krause's misconduct relates first and foremost to insufficient Investigation/clari?cation of
facts and a failure to remedy defects regarding IBOR and must be seen as quite serious.
However, he cannot be made responsible for any direct involvement in or facilitation of IBOR
manipulations.

a) BIRG review

As the Management Board member responsible for Group Audit between April 2009 and
December 2010, Mr. Krause must face the allegation that the BRIG review of the MMD Desk
carried out in this period was insuf?cient in that it found no indications of (potential) IBOR
manipulations when the communication was analyzed in this context. Furthermore, it was
possible for Mr. Cioete (also in the opinion of the external law firm Paul, Weiss) to exert
significant influence on the results stated in the related review report, which is contrary to the
nature of an independent investigation.

One possible explanation for this BIRG review that must be classified as ?awed could be that
Mr. Krause himself dealt with it only to a very limited extent, which he justi?ed, among other
things, by saying that he had had other priorities. This is all the more surprising taking into
account the fact that he had already participated in January 2009 In discussions on the high
bonus of Mr. Bitter, I.e. shortly before he took over the Group Audit function, which bonus
depended first and foremost on the pro?t generated by the MMD Desk i.e. precisely on what
the BIRG review was meant to investigate.

b) Internal Investigations of IBOR submissions at the bank

Furthermore, Mr. Krause must face the allegation that he, as the Management Board member
reSponsible for Group Audit, failed to implement periodic reviews of the 130R submission
processes at DB, as was also prescribed In the BBA rules In particular with a focus on LIBOR.
Against this background, EY comes to the conclusion that during the period in which
Mr. Krause was responsible for Group Audit, that function did not have a proper business
organization pursuant to Sec. 25a (1) KWG.

Risk management functions
Dr. Hugo B?nziger

From May 2006 until he left the bank at the end of May 2012, Dr.Bannger was a
Management Board member and Chief Risk Officer with departmental responsibility, inter alia,
for Legal and Compliance.

Dr. Banziger?s misconduct relates first and foremost to the incomplete and Inadequate
investigation of the 130R issues and the failure to remedy defects in this regard as well as to
incorrect statements made to parties outside the bank and, overall, must be seen as serious.

a) Omission of improvement measures concerning Market Risk Management

In his function as Chief Risk Of?cer, Dr. Banziger must face the allegation that Market Risk

Management, which was also reSponsible for GFFX, showed organizational and structural
de?cits in the period investigated by EY and that no adequate measures were implemented to
remedy them. Moreover, Dr. Banziger would have been required, in the opinion of EY, to take
measures to remedy the defects established in the BIRG report with regard to the MMD Desk.

b) Making of false statements

As the Management Board member responsible for Compliance, Dr. Banziger must assume
responsibility for the fact that false statements regarding the monitoring of submission
processes and the proper functioning of submission and monitoring processes were issued by
Compliance to third parties (EBA, FSA) on several occasions in 2011, even though he was not
directly Involved in compiling the information. He is furthermore also reproached of not having
taken suf?cient measures at least in reaction to the incorrect monitoring con?rmation issued
to the BBA.

c) Omission of Improvement measures concerning the submission processes

Likewise, as the person responsible for Compliance, Dr. Banziger must assume responsibility
for the fact that this function did not take adequate measures concerning the submission
processes after it had become known in June 2011 that a DB trader was suspected of IBOR
manipulation. For example, participation in training sessions on the submission process -
some of which had become mandatory - was not properly controlled, and it was not until
April 2012 that Compliance guidelines for the Implementation and monitoring of the
submission processes were published.

d) Failure to address inquiries by regulators

In his functions as the Management Board member responsible for Legal, Dr. Banziger must
face the allegation that, until March 2011, he did not address the inquiries by regulators that
DB had started to receive as of the beginning of 2010 and that, according to his own
statement, he forwarded these to DB Legal for reasons of independence - a reason that EY
cannot understand in light of his departmental responsibility for Legal. Furthermore, EY Is
surprised that even after the search of your premises conducted by the EU Commission in
September 2011, Dr. Banziger did not initiate any further investigations, which EY would in
fact have expected.

e) Completeness of the EMARS system

Finally, Dr. Banziger as the Management Board member responsible for Legal must face the
allegation that Legal did not check the communications platforms Investigated in the course of
your internal IBOR investigation for completeness, which Is why not all communications
applications were taken into account.

Stuart Lewis

Mr. Lewis was appointed to DB's Management Board as Chief Risk Officer on 1 June 2012.
Prior thereto, he had been the Deputy Chief Risk Officer and Chief Risk Officer of the
Corporate Investment Bank and, until 2010, Chief Credit Officer.

Mr. Lewis' misconduct is related in particular to a failure to investigate as well as to an
inadequate clari?cation of facts and a failure to remedy defects in connection with the IBOR
issues. As, in the opinion of EY, there was at times a violation, inter alia, of
Sec. 25a (1) KWG in this connection, this misconduct must, in aggregate, be seen as quite
serious.

a) Notification of inquiries by regulators had no consequences

Mr. Lewis must face the allegation that, in his position as Deputy Chief Risk Officer and Chief
Risk Of?cer of the Corporate Investment Bank, he was notified of the requests for
information regarding LIBOR by the SEC as early as In January 2010 and, as he himself has
stated, presumably took part in several telephone conferences of the Risk Executive
Committee regarding the ongoing internal investigation, but subsequently failed to order or
initiate extensive measures aimed at identifying potential malpractices in DB's IBOR
submissions.

b) Incomplete recording of submission processes

In his position as Chief Risk Officer, since September 2012, he has also been the Management
Board member responsible or the trading-Independent Benchmark Submission Oversight
(850) function, which, however, did not succeed until March 2014 in establishing a process to
ensure that all submission processes were fully recorded. In this connection, he is also
for the fact that, until the report was prepared by EY, it was not ensured at DB -
due to a lack of a uniform de?nition of the term ?benchmark? - that all reference rates were
notified to B50 and thus monitored by this function, and also that reference rates outside the
responsibility of the C385 division were not subject to monitoring by 350. Against this
background, EY has come to the conclusion that the submission processes in Market Risk
Management, a division under the responsibility of Mr. Lewis, did not meet the criteria of
proper business organization pursuant to Sec. 25a (1) KWG at least until March 2014.

c) Failure to address submission processes and misconduct

Furthermore, Mr. Lewis must face the allegation that, despite his responsibility as a
Management Board member and Chief Risk Officer, he obviously did not address submission
processes and identify earlier misconduct in connection with submissions at DB in a
suf?ciently in-depth manner, at least in the past. For instance, in a letter of 23 August 2013
sent to me, Mr. Lewis confirmed that Mr. Bittar had not had any connection to ISDAFIX
submissions - a statement that had to be revoked about a year later.

d) Incorrect statement made to BaFin

Against the background of the above, Mr. Lewis must face the additional allegation that he
made an incorrect written statement - albeit not on purpose - to BaFin in August 2013.

Technical infrastructure functions

Henry Ritchotte

Mr. Ritchotte was appointed to DB's Management Board as Chief Operating Of?cer on
1 June 2012. Prior thereto, he had been Co-Chief Operating Officer in Global Markets from
2009 and then took the position of Chief Operating Of?cer of this division directly afterwards,
which position he held until 31 May 2012. In this connection, Mr. Ritchotte was also
responsible for the operational management of the GFFX division in 2009, which division had
been entrusted with the submission of the IBOR reference rates and in which the traders
worked who were identified with regard to misconduct. As a Management Board member,
Mr. Ritchotte was also responsible for GT 0 as from June 2012.

In view of Mr. Ritchotte's aggregate misconduct and the severity thereof, which manifested
?rst and foremost by a failure to investigate as well as by inadequate investigation and
improvement measures in connection with submissions, it must be stated that his
misconduct is of a serious nature indeed. However, the fact must not be disregarded that
Mr. Ritchotte is one of a very small number of people within senior management who took an
early interest In an investigation of the IBOR issues at all.

a) Inadequate approach to low-bailing

Mr. Ritchotte must face the allegation that he did not already intensively deal with low-balling
starting in early 2009 (in his then current position as Co-Chief Operating Of?cer of Global
Markets and, thus, operational head of GFFX), a phenomenon that was being observed In the
market at the time, although this problem had in fact been known to him at the time as
evidenced by an e?maii sent to Mr. Jain on 19 February 2009 and although he had had
knowledge of the business strategy pursued by the GFFX division at least since
November 2008. Against this background, it could indeed have been expected that
Mr. Ritchotte in view of his position and responsibility at the time would initiate broad
investigation measures within "his" corporate division in order to ?nd out to what extent low-
balling and other IBOR-related irregularities were an issue to be addressed also at DB.

b) BIRG review

It must furthermore be noted that Mr. Ritchotte had knowledge, as early as in
September 2009, of the fact that Mr. Cloete, as the person responsible for GFi-?x, was actively
participating in the preparation of the BIRG review report (TB II, margin no. 103), as a result
of which he must at least have been aware that this could impair the independence of the
BIRG review. However, EY's audit report does not mention any intervention by Mr. Ritchotte
in this regard.

c) Inadequate improvement measures regarding the submission processes

In addition, Mr Ritchotte must face the allegation that the implementation of the improvement
measures proposed by the Business Solution Group (35G) regarding the ISDAFIX submission
processes merely focused on the USD ISDAFIX, whereas the rum or JPY ISDAFIX submission
processes, for example, were not investigated at all, although DB employees would have been
able to manipulate them, too, and although, in EY's opinion, they would have had to be
investigated as well.

d) Completeness of the EMARS system

Finally, Mr. Ritchotte, as the Management Board member responsible for GTO, must face the
allegation that, prior to September 2013, there was no uniform process at BB for identifying
platforms and software offering communication options and that no periodic checks as to the

completeness of EMARS had been implemented resulting in the fact that not all relevant data
sources were taken into account In the bank's internal IBOR investigation. Therefore,
Mr. Ritchotte was responsible for this malpractice for more than a year.

e) Investigations and measures ordered

In contrast, it must be noted In favor of Mr. Ritchotte that, in March 2009, he Instructed BIRG
to review the MMD Desk's account against the background of the profit shares existing at
the time. Furthermore, he took the su5picion of manipulation by the former trader
Guillaume Adolph - of which he learned in June 2011 - as a reason to instruct 856 in
July 2011 to record the submissions made by DB (except for LIBOR) and the controls existing
in this regard, which was followed, at the suggestion of Mr. Ritchotte, by a review of the
implementation of the resulting measures in November 2011. Finally, it must be noted that
the measures eventually taken in the GTO division for which Mr. Ritchotte had been
responsible at the time - In 2013 to record the communication systems used at DB in EMARS
are seen by EY as having been adequate and goal-oriented.

Hermann-Josef Lamberti

During the period investigated by EY until he left DB on 31 May 2012, Mr. Lamberti was a
Management Board member and Chief Operating Of?cer with responsibility for Global
Sourcing, Corporate Real Estate, IT, Settlement of Trading Activities and Human Resources.

Mr. Lamberti?s misconduct mainly relates to his insufficient involvement in investigation
measures and inadequate business processes in the GTO division - for which he had
responsibility - which must be viewed as serious. It must also be notes that Mr. Lamberti
was the only member of DB's senior management who did not consent to being questioned by
EY.

a) No involvement in taking organizational and personnel consequences

it must be noted that, despite his having knowledge of regulators' inquiries directed at DB
from March 2011 onwards, Mr. Lamberti himself did not actively participate in investigating
the involvement of DB traders in potential IBOR manipulations.

b) Completeness of the EMARS system

Furthermore, as the Management Board member responsible for IT and, thus, also the GTO
division, Mr. Lamberti is responsible for the fact that, until he left DB, there was no
instructions and rules in place at DB regarding responsibility for the complete coverage of all
communication platforms in EMARS, which meant, among other things, that not all relevant
communication channels were taken into account in the bank's internal IBOR investigation. In
the opinion of EY, there was thus no proper business Organization within the meaning of Sec.
25a (1) KWG in the GTO division for coverage of the communication platforms used within DB
and the collection of data contained therein.

Other Senior Management Review

I refer to the discussion in the audit report with regard to all other persons in the Senior
Management Review.

As stated above, an overall organization and business environment was created in the GFFX
division, which was responsible for the IBOR submissions, as well as in the other mentioned

divisions which eliminated control elements and favored or even facilitated the exploitation of
con?icts of interest. Although EY concludes that there were no Indications that current or
former members of the Management Board as well as the EEC knew about manipulations by
employees of DB prior to 2011 or had instructed employees to engage in such manipulations,
especially Mr. Jain, as the responsible person for the division, is alleged to have created a
business and organizational environmEnt which favoured incorrect IBOR submissions or even
made such incorrect submissions possible in the first place. The suspicion exists against
Mr. Cloete and Mr. Falssola that they already knew about manipulative acts at DB prior to
2011. Furthermore, Mr. Cloete, in his function as former head of the GFFX division, has
decisive responsibility for the business and organizational environment of the 130R
Submissions.

I also consider a particularly serious aspect to be that both during the course of your internal
investigations and when dealing with the IBOR issue at DB, the conclusion must be drawn
that necessary learning effects were either not obtained, or the resulting consequences are
not sufficient. This applies both to dealing with regulators as well as changes in internal
structures and procedures.

The responsible individuals especially In the trading division committed serious omissions
within their reSpective areas of responsibility which are not compatible with proper
management and proper business organization. Proper management in these divisions did
not even exist until the audit by EY. In particular, it cannot be determined for the time period
prior to the discontinuance of the ISDAFIX submissions by DB in April 2014 and for the IBOR
submissions until at least the middle of 2014 that Mr. Jain and Mr. Cloete took all necessary
action to establish proper ISDAFIX and IBOR processes.

I have been astonished to learn in recent months from the press that the suggestion Is that
the audit by BaFin supposedly resulted in clearing the senior management of DB, especially
Mr. Jain, and that supposedly no banking supervisory measures are expected in this regard.
In light of this background I expressly want to point out to you that this is not correct. From
the point of view of banking supervision, the fulfilling of obligations for the proper
management and the personal, active involvement in cases of manipulation play an equally
decisive role for the imposition of measures.

I will compile the results of my analysis with the results of other audits of the C385 division
and obtain a comprehensive picture about the events and the responsibilities In this business
segment in an overall assessment. I will also ?nally examine the imposition of banking
supervisory measures. I am already now giving you the possibility to comment on today's
letter and to provide me with such comments within the next eight weeks.

The chairman of the Supervisory Board of your institution, Dr. Achleitner, the European
Central Bank as well as the Deutsche Bundesbank, main office in Hessen, are receiving a copy
of this letter.

Yours sincerely
As representative
[signature]

Frauke Menke
Department President [seal of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority]


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